Strategic Product Placement and Pricing in Markets with Inattentive Consumers by Dahremöller, Carsten
Strategic Product Placement and
Pricing in Markets with Inattentive
Consumers
Inaugural-Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doktors
der Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftswissenschaften
durch die
Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakulta¨t
der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universita¨t
Bonn
vorgelegt von
Carsten Dahremo¨ller
aus Bonn
Bonn 2013
II Strategic Product Placement and Pricing in Markets with Inattentive Consumers
Dekan: Prof. Dr. Klaus Sandmann
Erstreferent: Prof. Dr. Matthias Kra¨kel
Zweitreferent: Prof. Dr. Dezso¨ Szalay
Tag der mu¨ndlichen Pru¨fung: 24.04.2013
Acknowledgements
In preparing this thesis I received support from many people to whom I am grateful.
First and foremost, I want to thank Matthias Kra¨kel who has been a great supervisor.
He provided very detailed and constructive comments to all three chapters of my thesis.
My sincere thanks are also due to Dezso¨ Szalay for acting as a referee on my thesis
committee.
Moreover, I am particularly grateful to Markus Fels. He has not only been a good
friend, our joint research has been a fruitful, usually fun, and inspiring activity. Chapter
III of this thesis is an achievement of this cooperation.
I also owe many thanks to Simon Dato, who also contributed to Chapter II. Our
countless discussions significantly improved this thesis.
Chapter I benefited a lot from comments and suggestions made by Paul Heidhues. I
have learned a lot from him and he has been extremely supportive. In additition, he
was the one who aroused my interest for behavioral economic theory.
The Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) provided not only financial sup-
port but also, and more importantly, a stimulating environment with many young
researchers. I would like to thank all people who have contributed to this organization,
especially Urs Schweizer. Moreover, I am indebted to Paul Heidhues for motivating
me to apply for the BGSE. I also would like to thank the Max Planck Institute for
Research on Collective Goods for additional financial support.
The topics courses of the Bonn Graduate School of Economics improved my under-
standing of several fields of Economics and provided useful hints for my own research.
Therefore, I am grateful to the lecturers of the courses I attended: Susanne Goldlu¨cke,
Daniel Kra¨hmer, Sebastian Kranz, Marc Le Quement, Dezso¨ Szalay and Alessia Testa.
I have benefited from discussions with and comments made by my office mates:
Christoph Roling, Stephan Luck, Jasmin Gider, Anke Becker, Fabian Kosse and Paul
Schempp. Moreover, I owe thanks to Fabian Herweg and Daniel Mu¨ller.
Finally, I owe much to Annet, my family and friends, without whom I would not
have gone so far, and who gave me unconditional support for all my endeavors.

Contents
I. Unshrouding for Competitive Advantage 5
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1. The Impact of Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2. The Impact of Asymmetric Add-on Production Costs . . . . . . 16
3.3. Equivalence of the Model to a Repeated Play of the GL Setting 17
3.4. The Impact of Observable Add-on Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.5. The Impact of Unobservable Add-on Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.6. The Impact of Specific Demand Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.7. Further Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4. Review of the Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
II. Collusive Shrouding and Cartelization 25
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2. Review of the Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3. The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.1. Model Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2. Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3. Welfare Analysis and Regulatory Intervention . . . . . . . . . . 42
4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
III.Product Lines, Product Design, and Limited Attention 47
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2. The Role of Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.1. Comparison to Other Models of Limited Attention . . . . . . . 56
3. Optimal Product Design of a Monopolist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4. Optimal Product Design with Introduction of a Bait Good . . . . . . . 63
5. Usage of Several Bait Goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
VI Strategic Product Placement and Pricing in Markets with Inattentive Consumers
6. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6.1. Heterogeneous Consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6.2. Negative “Qualities” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6.3. Attribute Dependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
7. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
A. Appendices 75
1. Appendix to Chapter I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
1.1. Proof of Proposition I.1: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
1.2. Proof of Proposition I.2: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
1.3. Proof of Proposition I.3: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2. Appendix to Chapter II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.1. Proof of Lemma II.1: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.2. Proof of Proposition II.2: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.3. Proof of Proposition II.4: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3. Appendix to Chapter III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.1. Derivation of an Optimal Attention Allocation under Cognitive
Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
List of Figures
II.1. Aggregate firm profits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Introduction
The theory of Industrial Organization has a long tradition in the field of Economics.
Relatively novel to this field is the introduction of behavioral biases of consumers that
are incorporated into this theory.1 If one would like to segment this literature, it could
be categorized by the different forms of behavioral consumer biases that are considered.
Examples of the behavioral biases that have been incorporated into the Industrial
Organization literature are, e.g., prospect theory, limited attention, overconfidence,
time inconsistent behavior, and limited foresight. This dissertation aims at contributing
to the strand of Behavioral Industrial Organization that investigates the impact of
limited consumer attention on firm behavior in retail markets. Prominent examples
among the numerous works in this strand of literature are Gabaix and Laibson (2006),
Armstrong and Chen (2009), Carlin (2009), Wilson (2010), Carlin and Manso (2011),
and Ellison and Wolitzky (2011).
This dissertation contains three seperate chapters. Within the first two chapters
we assume that the specifications of consumer attention are exogeneously given. In
the presented models, this means that some myopic consumers do not take add-ons
and their respective prices into account when they make their purchase decisions. In
contrast to this exogeneously given attention heuristic that neglects certain product
aspects, the process of attention allocation is endogenized in the third chapter of this
dissertation. We achieve this by introducing an attention allocation process that is
’built-in’ for each consumer. One interpretation of this process of attention allocation
is to see it as the solution of some evolutionary optimization process, as we argue in
the Appendix. This process of attention allocation determines how, given a certain set
of products, consumers allocate their attention among the different attributes of the
available products. This endogenization of attention allows for more realistic results
on consumer focus and on the ways in which firms can manipulate consumer attention
and behavior.
Chapter I is a reprint of Dahremo¨ller (forthcoming). It studies a market in which
competing firms sell both a base good and an add-on. Initially, the prices of the base
goods are known to all consumers while the prices of the add-ons are shrouded and
1See Spiegler (2011) for an excellent overview.
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cannot be observed by consumers. The firms compete over a consumer population that
is, in part, myopic. This means that some of the consumers do not incorporate the
add-on into their purchase decisions. The particular composition of the population,
however, can be manipulated by the competing firms. If one firm decides to unshroud
the add-on, some of the myopic consumers get educated and all add-on prices become
publicly observable. The model is strongly inspired by the seminal work of Gabaix and
Laibson (2006), where the authors show that, if firms simultaneously set their prices
and decide whether to unshroud the add-on, an equilibrium exists in which all firms
shroud the add-on. This was a novel result as traditional models of voluntary disclosure
of information could not explain the observation that in some markets firms seem to
actively engage in obfuscation.2
The model of Chapter I applies some slight modifications to the model of Gabaix
and Laibson (2006) and shows that these have substantial implications on the gameplay
and on the incentives of firms. The most central modification is the assumption that
unshrouding and price-setting do not take place simultaneously. In particular, I assume
that firms first decide about unshrouding and before setting their prices. Another
modification is the assumption that firms are heterogeneous in their add-on profitability.
Applying this model, I find that the shrouding equilibrium vanishes as there always
exists one firm that has an incentive to wreck the other firms attempts at shrouding.
By doing so, the rival firm can influence the shrouding firms profit in the add-on market
and thereby profitably soften competition in the base good market.
These results suggest that the central driver behind the incentives of firms to un-
shroud the add-on is the longevity of the unshrouding mechanism. If unshrouding
has only short-term effects, like in Gabaix and Laibson (2006), firms are expected to
leave the add-on shrouded, conditional on the existence of a sufficient number of my-
opic consumers. If, in contrast, unshrouding has long-term effects, like in Dahremo¨ller
(forthcoming), firms are expected to unshroud the add-on for all variations of the
consumer population, conditional on the firms having sufficiently strong comparative
differences in add-on profitability.
Chapter II is based on joint work with Simon Dato. The paper further extends the
models of Gabaix and Laibson (2006) and Dahremo¨ller (forthcoming) by applying a
related framework in an infinitely repeated game. In every period of the game a number
of firms sell both a base good and an add-on and decide whether or not to unshroud the
add-on. As in Dahremo¨ller (forthcoming), unshrouding is strategic in the sense that it
has an impact on the future structure of the game and thereby potentially also on future
profits of firms. In the particular model, this means that once a firm has unshrouded
2Among the traditional works in this field are Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981), and Shapiro (1995).
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the add-on, all myopic consumers become sophisticated for all future periods of the
game. We show that, given sufficient parameter conditions, two types of equilibria
exists. In the so-called unshrouding equilibrium at least one firm unshrouds the add-
on and all firms behave competitively without engaging in collusion. In the so-called
shrouding equilibrium all firms shroud the add-on and collude on monopoly prices. It
holds that, while there is a short-term individual incentive to unshroud the add-on,
there is a collective long-term incentive to leave the add-on shrouded. In particular,
there are two incentives for firms to leave the add-on shrouded. First, shrouding may
be a requirement for collusion between firms. This is because shrouding the add-on
makes it less rewarding for firms to deviate from collusion, implying that collusion is
more stable. Second, even if collusion is already stable, shrouding increases joint firm
profits.
These results have several implications on governmental policies and on potential
regulatory interventions. In particular, the fact that shrouding may be a requirement
for collusion has two main implications. First, the degree of obfuscation in a market
may be a novel indicator that can be used to detect illegal cartels. Second, if the
regulator can intervene to unshroud the add-on, collusion might be destabilized, leading
to stronger competition between the firms in the market.
Chapter III is based on joint work with Markus Fels. We consider a monopolist that
serves a population of consumers who exhibit a particular form of limited attention.
Consumer attention is limited in the sense that consumers have trouble when comparing
products with many different attributes and incur a cognitive cost when trying to do
so. If consumers face such a choice between complex products, they use a heuristic
to allocate their attention to specific attributes of the available choices. In particular,
we show that there exists a natural ordering that determines how the attention is
allocated. Our functional form of the cognition costs is closely related to two other
papers. First, the idea that consumers pay higher attention to attributes that exhibit
high dispersion within the choice set is also present in Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2012).
Second, the idea that consumers use an attention allocation heuristic that is the result
of an evolutionary optimization process is similar to Gabaix (2011). One of the novelties
of our attention allocation is that the cognitive cost of attention is dependent on the
number of attributes that are already taken into account. This implies that consumers
can easily distinguish between products that differ in only one attribute (e.g., between
standard goods that only differ in their price). However, if consumers have to choose
between very complex products, any new attribute that is added to the product receives
little attention or is even completely neglected.
After having derived and motivated our attention allocation mechanism, we analyze
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its implications for attention allocation as well as the means by which consumer atten-
tion can be manipulated. We apply this attention allocation mechanism by analyzing
how a profit-maximizing firm reacts to such cognitive constraints of the consumer pop-
ulation. First we assume that the firm can only produce one product and derive the
optimal design of this product. Then we continue by allowing for several products.
We show that, if the firm can produce several products, it has an incentive to extend
its product line by offering premium quality products that are not intended for sale,
but have the sole function of manipulating consumer attention. We then discuss the
optimal design of these so-called bait goods and outline the underlying intuitions.
I. Unshrouding for Competitive
Advantage
In a market with hidden product details and systematic consumer
biases, firms have the possibility to unshroud and thereby to rectify
such market obliquities. While the classical view was that firms
will have an incentive to unshroud, Gabaix and Laibson (2006)
show that there exist constellations in which firms prefer to leave
the market shrouded. Building on that model I introduce a more
strategic and long-term dimension of unshrouding which turns
out to fundamentally alter the underlying incentives to unshroud.
In particular, I show that there exists an incentive to unshroud
that stems from differences in add-on profitability and that it is
dependent on parameter constellations whether a more profitable
or a less profitable firm will want to unshroud.
6 Strategic Product Placement and Pricing in Markets with Inattentive Consumers
1. Introduction
Consumers in many markets have difficulties making rational decisions or face barriers
when trying to collect all information that is relevant for their consumption choice.
In these markets firms might either foster or alleviate such market obliquities. For
example, in the case of retail financial markets, Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) iden-
tify an array of contract characteristics that can influence the information reception of
consumers. Among them are nonlinear pricing, schedule complexity, frequent revisions
of schedules, complex vocabulary, delayed costs or bundled consumption. By employ-
ing or refraining from these contract characteristics firms are able to manipulate the
perceptions of consumers.
In the following I propose a model of such markets in which the degree of consumer
sophistication can be manipulated by the competing firms. My model is inspired by
the seminal work of Gabaix and Laibson (2006) (henceforth GL), who model an add-on
market with hidden add-on prices and limited consumer attention. Firms set prices for
their base goods and add-ons and have the option to unshroud the add-on. In their
model, both the pricing and the unshrouding decisions are taken simultaneously. If
any firm decides to unshroud, all add-on prices get revealed and a part of the consumer
population gets educated. Building on this model GL show that, for certain parameter
constellations, equilibria exist in which none of the firms unshrouds the add-on.
In the following, I will enrich the model of GL by assuming that firms are hetero-
geneous in their add-on profitability and, more importantly, by applying a different
modeling of consumer education. In particular, I will assume that firms can shroud
or unshroud the add-on before they set their prices. This allows unshrouding to have
more long-term consequences than in the model of GL.
Using this framework I show that for almost all parameter constellations no shrouding
equilibrium exists. At least one firm has an incentive to unshroud the add-on in an
attempt to wreck the rival firm’s attempts at shrouding. By doing so, the unshrouding
firm can influence the shrouding firm’s profits within the add-on market and thereby
profitably soften competition in the base good market. This incentive to unshroud
the add-on is driven by the differences between the firms with regard to their add-on
profitability. Thereby it is dependent on parameter constellations whether it is the
comparatively efficient firm or the comparatively inefficient firm that unshrouds the
add-on.
To motivate my results I first want to give some anecdotal evidence for the depicted
firm behavior, in particular for the prediction that there exist cases in which either an
efficient firm or an inefficient firm unshrouds the add-on. An example of unshrouding
by an efficient firm could be Citibank if it advertises the convenience of its dense
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coverage of branches. It is efficient because due to its size it has a large number of
branches, and due to its market share, it profits from its economies of scale and its
per-customer costs of providing local services are low. In contrast, smaller banks have
higher cost and might have to rely on cash points from other banks which is costly for its
customers. If Citibank would then advertise its dense branch and cash point coverage,
this might induce customers to take such features into account when making their
purchase decision and increase their likelihood to relocate their account to Citibank.
An example of unshrouding by an inefficient firm was the bank Barclays when it
introduced iShares, which are a collection of exchange traded funds that are passively
managed and track the value of certain underlying assets, for example the S&P 500.
Such investment vehicles are usually offered as supplementary services to bank account
holders. On average, such passively managed funds perform better than actively man-
aged funds (Gruber 1996), which were and still are a very popular investment vehicle.
Barclays, in contrast to other banks, did not make much profit from actively managed
funds due to a lack of scale. Although Barclays continued to offer actively managed
funds after the introduction of iShares, they launched an advertisement campaign em-
phasizing the benefits of their new iShares product, but also pointing out disadvantages
and negative attributes of actively managed funds.1 This can be seen as an attempt
to sabotage the market for actively managed funds. In other words, Barclays tried to
acquit itself from its comparative disadvantage by trying to dissolve the add-on market
in which it is inefficient.
The results of this paper also give an indication what markets are particularly sus-
ceptible to shrouding. As said before, I show that at least one firm will unshroud the
add-on if unshrouding is costless. Evidently, in reality there might be costs associated
with unshrouding. For example, there might be costs of setting up an advertisement
campaign, costs of providing information to consumers, or costs for professionals which
customers can consult. Such costs make unshrouding less attractive. Now recall that
the incentive to unshroud is driven by the differences between the firms with regard
to their profitability in the add-on dimension. Therefore, unshrouding should be more
likely to be observed in markets in which firms have considerable differences in add-on
profitability while shrouding should be observed in markets with rather homogeneous
add-on profitability.
An example for a market with relatively homogeneous production costs is the hotel
market. It is unlikely that hotels’ costs of providing services such as telephone calls or
minibar supplies differ substantially. Hence, this market is unlikely to be unshrouded
1See Carrell (2008) for further details. The advertisement campaign reported the hidden costs,
intransparency, illiquidity and comparatively low performance of actively managed funds.
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by any of the participating firms.
A market with substantial cost differences would be the banking and financial in-
dustries sector. Due to different sizes and strategic orientations, these industries differ
significantly in terms of marginal production costs. For example, if a bank manages
a portfolio of investment funds which are highly in demand, the costs of serving an
additional customer are small. This is different for small local banks which do not have
a well-established portfolio of investment vehicles. Hence, I conjecture that in such
markets unshrouding is particularly likely.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the
main model and results. Section 3 analyzes various extensions and further implications.
Section 4 will give a short overview of the related literature. Section 5 will conclude.
2. The Model
There exist two firms that both produce a base good and an add-on. Firms are rational,
risk-neutral and aware of the behavioral biases of the consumer population. One of the
firms is inefficient in the add-on dimension, which is captured by having higher add-on
production costs than its competitor. Add-on production costs are denoted by cˆi and
for simplicity I will assume that cˆ1 = 0 and cˆ2 = cˆ > 0. Hence, firm 1 is more efficient
in producing the add-on than firm 2. Firms set prices pi for the base good and pˆi for the
add-on. The prices of the base goods are common knowledge, but initially the prices of
the add-ons are shrouded and consumers cannot observe them. The population consists
of α ∈ (0, 1) myopic consumers and (1−α) sophisticated consumers. The sophisticated
consumers know about the existence of the add-on and form Bayesian posteriors about
its price. In contrast, myopic consumers do not know about the existence of the add-on
or, equivalently, do not anticipate that they will need it.
An example for a market with myopic consumers would be the printer market where
a consumer may not anticipate that she will probably need to buy cartridges with
lifetime costs typically significantly exceeding the cost of the printer.2 Another example
are retail financial markets where the base good is typically a bank account which
offers many add-on services such as overdrafts, money transfers, financial consultancy
and investment services. Cruickshank (2000) reports that consumers are often poorly
informed when selecting their current account provider and pay only little attention to
add-on fees and conditions. Such behavior is potentially myopic in the sense that add-
on fees are a substantial part of the account expenses and hence should be considered
2According to the Office of Fair Trading (2002) consumers spend 2 to 17 times more on cartridges
than on the printer itself.
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by consumers.
In line with GL, I assume that instead of buying the add-on, consumers can engage
in an upfront substitution. For example, holders of a bank account could apply for a
bank loan when running into financial distress instead of using the last minute solution
of an expensive overdraft. Since sophisticates anticipate their future need for the add-
on, they will engage in this substitution if the firm from which they bought the base
good employs high add-on prices. In contrast, myopic consumers do not anticipate
their need for the add-on and hence will never substitute. Evidence for such behavior
of myopic consumers is given by Massoud et al. (2007) who report that a substantial
fraction of credit card consumers pay penalty fees although they had enough cash on
their current account to balance their credit card debts, and by Stango and Zinman
(2009) who report that the median household in their data set pays $500 of credit card
fees per year while over half of these costs could have easily been avoided. Both works
reckon that many consumers potentially exhibit myopic behavior as they just forget
or do not consider transferring money from their current account to their credit card
account to balance it.
Each firm can decide to unshroud the add-on at zero cost. If at least one firm does so,
all add-on prices become observable and a fraction of λ ∈ (0, 1) myopes gets educated
and henceforth behaves like the sophisticated consumers. Define α′ ≡ α(1 − λ) to be
the remaining fraction of uneducatable myopes.
Unlike GL, I assume that firms decide about their shrouding behavior before they
set their prices. Since the shrouding strategies of firms are determined at the beginning
of the game, consumer education potentially is a strategic variable with long-term im-
plications. One example in which consumer education has such long-term implications
are markets in which firms interact repeatedly with the same population of consumers.
If consumers learn about potential pitfalls related to add-ons, they are likely to keep
that knowledge in mind and incorporate it in future purchase decisions. In a repeated
game this would mean that once myopic consumers get educated, they retain their
sophistication for future periods. For example, in a study about credit card markets
Agarwal et al. (2011) report that the quality of decisions a consumer makes increases
with her experience in that market. Along these lines, Agarwal et al. (2009) argue that
financial literacy is persistent over long periods of time. In contrast to sticky consumer
sophistication, prices tend to be much more flexible and can be adjusted quickly. In
terms of the model this means that current pricing has no implications for future pe-
riods. This repeated game can then be boiled down to a one-shot game in which firms
decide about unshrouding before they set their prices.3
3I will argue later in more detail that the qualitative effects of the repeated game and the sequential
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After firms choose their shrouding behavior they set their prices for the base good
and the add-on. At this stage, firms have full knowledge of the preceding actions of
the competing firms. Hence, they know what the fractions of (remaining) myopic and
sophisticated consumers are. This allows firms to adapt their pricing decisions to the
(un)shrouding decisions that were taken at the beginning of the game.
Note here that the assumption that unshrouding educates (some) myopic consumers
and reveals add-on prices closely follows the design of GL. This will be used to show
that the two major modeling changes, namely timing of unshrouding and competitive
advantages, will lead to completely novel incentives to unshroud. However, assuming
that prices can be made observable before they are fixed may not be reasonable in all
market settings. Therefore, I will discuss several alternative modelings with regard to
price observability in the discussion section and show that these do not qualitatively
change the results.
In the base good market firms compete via Hotelling competition.4 A unit mass
of consumers is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. Each consumer purchases
at most one unit of the base good. The firms are located on the boundaries of the
market, firm 1 at position 0 and firm 2 at position 1. Let t denote the consumers’ cost
of travelling one unit of distance. Intuitively, the position of a consumer represents her
“ideal variety”and the travelling costs represent her disutility from consuming a product
that is different from her ideal. Hence, such a Hotelling setting can be interpreted as a
model of consumer brand preferences with t being the degree of brand differentiation.
In addition, I assume that consumers’ valuation for the good is high enough such that
in equilibrium all consumers buy the base good.
As outlined before, consumers can decide whether to buy the add-on from the firm
from which they purchased the base good or whether to use an outside substitution
at cost e (to be aquired in advance). I assume the tie-breaking rule that consumers
decide to buy the add-on and not to substitute if they are indifferent. If a consumer
did not substitute, she can only buy the add-on from the firm from which she bought
the base good. Similar to GL, I assume that the add-on price is bounded above by p¯,
which can be interpreted as the maximum willingness to pay, the price of a last minute
substitution or a regulatory price ceiling (e < p¯, cˆ < p¯). I further assume that cˆ < 3t,
which ensures that the inefficient firm 2 makes positive equilibrium profits and is thus
willing to participate in the market.
one-shot game are indeed the same.
4See, among many others, Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) or Ellison (2005) for modeling consumer
preferences in this way.
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The timeline of the game is as follows:
• Period 0: Firms decide whether or not to unshroud the add-on.
• Period 1: Firms observe all (un)shrouding decisions and set prices pi for the
base good and pˆi for the add-on.
• Period 2: Consumers choose a firm to purchase the base good. Consumers can
initiate substitution effort at cost e.
• Period 3: All consumers observe the add-on prices and purchase the add-on if
they did not substitute in period 2.
The central point of the following analysis is to determine whether or not an equilibrium
exists in which all firms shroud the add-on. Recall that one unshrouding firm suffices
to reveal add-on prices and to educate the educatable consumers.
Definition I.1.
- Shrouding equilibrium: An equilibrium in which all firms shroud the add-on.
- Unshrouding equilibrium: An equilibrium in which at least one firm unshrouds
the add-on.
The game is solved by backward induction. Calculating prices and profits in the
shrouded and in the unshrouded subgame allows me to determine whether or not firms
have an incentive to unshroud the add-on. At the pricing stage, the optimal pricing
decision is dependent on the fractions of sophisticates and (remaining) myopes. This
composition of the population is determined by the shrouding decisions of firms in the
first stage of the game. In particular, if no firm unshrouded the add-on, the composition
remains at its initial state and there are α myopic consumers in the market. If in
contrast any firm unshrouded the add-on, there are α′ < α myopes remaining.
Firms compete via Hotelling competition. Myopic consumers do not consider the
add-on and hence anticipate to pay only the price of the base good pi. In contrast,
sophisticates consider the add-on and substitute if they anticipate a high add-on price.
Hence, they anticipate to pay pi + min{e, E[pˆi]}. To compute the value of this expres-
sion, the following lemma can be applied:
Lemma I.1. Firms will choose add-on prices pˆi only from the set {e, p¯}.
Suppose first that the add-on is unshrouded and hence its price is observable with
E[pˆi] = pˆi. For an add-on price pˆi < e sophisticates will not substitute but rather buy
the add-on. Then, it holds that the firm could increase its profit by lowering pi by a
small amount and raising pˆi by the same amount. This leaves the demand and profit
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from sophisticates unchanged, but increases the demand and profit from myopes. For
an add-on price e < pˆi < p¯ only myopes buy the add-on. Then, a raise in the add-
on price pˆi has no effect on the demand but a positive effect on add-on revenues and
thereby also on the firm’s profit. Now suppose that the add-on is shrouded and hence
its price is unobservable. In this case the demand of both types of consumers only
depends on the base good price. Again it holds that for an add-on price pˆi < p¯ the firm
can increase its profit by raising this price and leaving the demand unchanged. Hence,
firms will only set add-on prices such that pˆi ∈ {e, p¯}.
Now let us calculate the demand functions of consumers. Sophisticated consumers
form Bayesian posteriors and hence correctly anticipate or observe add-on prices (de-
pending on the shrouding decisions). Hence, they will substitute if the add-on price is
p¯. This implies that sophisticates will always pay e because they either buy a low-priced
add-on at price e or substitute. Now I can apply the usual Hotelling logic. I try to find
a consumer who is indifferent between buying at firm 1 or at firm 2. Denote the position
of this indifferent consumers as a ∈ [0, 1]. Having found such a consumer, it holds that
all consumers “left” to the indifferent one will prefer to buy from the “left” firm 1 while
all consumers “right” to the indifferent one will buy from the “right” firm 2. Since the
consumers are uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1], it follows that the demand of
firm 1 is D1(p1, p2) = a and the demand of firm 2 is D2(p1, p2) = 1−a. A sophisticated
consumer with location a is indifferent if p1 + e+ ta = p2 + e+ t(1− a). In contrast to
sophisticated consumers, myopic consumers only consider the price of the base good.
Hence, a myope with location a is indifferent between firms if p1 + ta = p2 + t(1−a). It
then holds that the locations of the indifferent consumers are identical for both myopic
and sophisticated consumers. The demand functions for the base good then take the
following form:
D1(p1, p2) =
p2 − p1 + t
2t
and D2(p1, p2) =
p1 − p2 + t
2t
.
Now I can calculate the profits that firms earn in equilibrium. First suppose that
the add-on is shrouded and hence consumers cannot observe add-on prices. Then,
consumers cannot condition their base good choice or their substitution behavior on
add-on prices. Hence, in the last stage when the add-on is purchased each firm has
monopoly power over all its customers who did not substitute. Therefore, firms will
employ high add-on prices pˆi = p¯. This is correctly anticipated by sophisticated con-
sumers who will engage in substitution and each firm will sell the add-on only to its α
myopic consumers. Hence, the profit functions take the form:
pi1(p1, p2) =
p2 − p1 + t
2t
(p1 + αp¯) and pi2(p1, p2) =
p1 − p2 + t
2t
(p2 + α(p¯− cˆ)).
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Each firm individually maximizes its profit, yielding optimal base good prices p1 =
t−αp¯+ αcˆ
3
and p2 = t−αp¯+ 2αcˆ3 . Inserting these prices into the profit functions yields
the following profits:
piS1 =
1
2t
(
t+
αcˆ
3
)2
and piS2 =
1
2t
(
t− αcˆ
3
)2
.
To determine the incentives of firms to unshroud the add-on, these shrouded profits
have to be compared with the profits in the unshrouded subgame. If any firm has
unshrouded the add-on, sophisticates and educated myopes can observe add-on prices.
Hence, firms may have an incentive to set lower add-on prices to prevent their customers
from substituting. First consider the efficient firm 1. Given the prices p2 and pˆ2, firm 1
can choose between the following profit functions:5
pie1 =
p2 − p1 + t
2t
(p1 + e) or pi
p¯
1 =
p2 − p1 + t
2t
(p1 + α
′p¯).
Then, it holds that maxp1 pi
e
1 > maxp1 pi
p¯
1 if and only if e > α
′p¯. Hence, the efficient
firm 1 will choose low add-on prices e if α′ < e
p¯
and high add-on prices p¯ if α′ > e
p¯
.6
Applying a similar argument yields that the inefficient firm 2 will choose pˆ2 = e if
α′ < e−cˆ
p¯−cˆ and pˆ2 = p¯ if α
′ > e−cˆ
p¯−cˆ . This yields the following profits in the unshrouded
subgame:
pˆ1 Profit of firm 1 pˆ2 Profit of firm 2
α′ < e−cˆ
p¯−cˆ pˆ1 = e pi
U1
1 =
1
2t
(
t+ cˆ
3
)2
pˆ2 = e pi
U1
2 =
1
2t
(
t− cˆ
3
)2
e−cˆ
p¯−cˆ < α
′ < e
p¯
pˆ1 = e pi
U2
1 =
1
2t
(
t+ α
′cˆ
3
− α′p¯−e
3
)2
pˆ2 = p¯ pi
U2
2 =
1
2t
(
t− α′cˆ
3
+ α
′p¯−e
3
)2
e
p¯
< α′ pˆ1 = p¯ piU31 =
1
2t
(
t+ α
′cˆ
3
)2
pˆ2 = p¯ pi
U3
2 =
1
2t
(
t− α′cˆ
3
)2
Note here that the assumption cˆ < 3t ensures that the profits of the inefficient firm 2
are positive in all cases.
Having determined all potential profits now allows me to state the following propo-
sition:
Proposition I.1. With exception of the knife-edge case α′ = e−αcˆ
p¯−cˆ , there does not exist
a shrouding equilibrium for all parameter constellations of α and α′: (i) if α′ < e−αcˆ
p¯−cˆ ,
the efficient firm 1 will unshroud the add-on; (ii) otherwise, the inefficient firm 2 will
unshroud the add-on.
5Note that due to unshrouding the fraction of myopic consumers has shrunk to α′.
6I will show in the Appendix that for special parameter constellations there also exists an equilibrium
in which firms mix over add-on prices. However, this mixing has no effect on profits or on the
incentive to unshroud.
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First suppose it holds that there are only very few uneducatable myopes (α′ < e−cˆ
p¯−cˆ).
7
Then, it holds that piU11 > pi
S
1 and hence the efficient firm 1 has an incentive to unshroud
the add-on. To get an intuition for this result consider the choice of add-on prices.
In the shrouded subgame both firms set a high add-on price p¯. In the unshrouded
subgame both firms set add-on prices e. This change in add-on prices is worse for the
inefficient firm since, due to its production costs, the add-on profits of the inefficient
firm 2 fall more heavily with the reduction in the add-on price than profits of the
efficient firm 1. In addition, the inefficient firm 2 profits less from the increase in add-
on sales. This means that, compared to the shrouded subgame, unshrouding increases
the profit differences between firms. Now recall that one of the implications of the
existence of the add-on is that firms subsidize base good prices because they know that
they will generate extra add-on revenues from customers that are “locked in” by having
bought the base good.8 This means that unshrouding lowers the value of attracting
another customer for the inefficient firm 2. In other words, firm 2 is less willing to
push add-on sales through low base good prices and firm 2 will compete less fiercely
in the base good market. Following this logic, the efficient firm 1 anticipates that
the reduction of competitive pressure leads to an increase of its own profits, thereby
creating an incentive to unshroud the add-on. Note here that the incentives of firms
run in opposite directions. The advantage that firm 1 creates for itself by shrouding
constitutes a disadvantage for firm 2. Hence, in this case the inefficient firm 2 would
prefer the add-on to be shrouded.
Now consider the case with a high fraction of uneducatable myopes ( e
p¯
< α′). In
this case it holds that piU32 > pi
S
2 . The intuition goes as follows: In such a situation
both firms will find it worthwhile, even in the unshrouded subgame, to set high add-on
prices p¯ in order to exploit the high fraction of uneducatable myopic consumers. As
before, due to its inefficiency, firm 2 profits less from add-on sales than the efficient
firm 1. Now recall that unshrouding reduces the fraction of myopic consumers from α
to α′. The resulting reduction in add-on sales is more damaging to the “high-margin”
firm 1 than for the “low-margin” firm 2. Therefore, after firm 2 has unshrouded the
add-on, the efficient firm 1 is competing less fiercely in the base good market. Note
here that firm 2 also loses add-on profits, however the reduced add-on profits are offset
by the slackened competition in the base good market. This means that the inefficient
firm 2 can use unshrouding as a tool to reduce the competitive advantage of firm 1. In
7Note that this case might not exist since e−cˆp¯−cˆ is negative if e < cˆ.
8See Massoud et al. (2011) who argue that penalty fees in the credit card business (price of the
add-on) are a direct substitute for interest rates (price of the base good). The authors show that
firms try to attract additional customers by employing low interest rates while at the same time
conserving their profits high by employing high penalty fees.
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other words, unshrouding serves as a kind of sabotage device to diminish the size of
the add-on market and to consequently reduce the competitive differences. Note again
that while firm 2 has an incentive to unshroud the add-on, the efficient firm 1 would
prefer the add-on to be shrouded.
Finally, consider the case where the fraction of uneducatable myopes is intermediate
( e−cˆ
p¯−cˆ < α
′ < e
p¯
). In this case the efficient firm 1 will set a low add-on price e while the
inefficient firm 2 will set a high price p¯. The logic behind the incentive to unshroud
is similar to the two cases above, namely that unshrouding serves as a tool to amplify
or to mitigate competitive differences. For the lower part of the interval (α′ < e−αcˆ
p¯−cˆ )
it holds that piU21 > pi
S
1 and hence the efficient firm 1 has an incentive to unshroud
the add-on.9 In contrast, for the upper part of the interval ( e−αcˆ
p¯−cˆ < α
′) it holds that
piU22 > pi
S
2 and consequently the inefficient firm 2 has an incentive to unshroud the
add-on.
Note here that it is not guaranteed that the region in which firm 1 unshrouds does
exist since this requires e > αcˆ. Hence, if cˆ is sufficiently low, only firm 2 will have an
incentive to unshroud. However, this has no impact on the result that for almost all
possible parameter constellations at least one firm has a strict incentive to unshroud
the add-on.
I have shown that for almost all fractions of (uneducatable) myopic consumers α
and α′ one of the firms will unshroud. This stands in contrast to the result of GL who
conclude that a shrouding equilibrium exists for a sufficiently large fraction of myopic
consumers, i.e. for α ≥ e
p¯
. The difference in results mainly stems from the fact that
the underlying reasons for unshrouding are very different in the two setups. To see
this suppose that firms would play a shrouding equilibrium. In the model of GL the
reason to deviate to unshrouding lies in the intent to inform sophisticates about low
add-on prices and thereby to prevent them from substituting. This potentially creates
a short-term gain from unshrouding which is due to the incapability of the other firm
to react to the deviation. This deviation is worthwhile if there are enough sophisticates
in the market, or equivalently, if there are sufficiently few myopes α < e
p¯
. However, this
short term gain is not attainable if firms are able to condition their pricing behavior
on shrouding decisions. Therefore, the result of GL is not robust with regard to the
proposed strategic dimension of unshrouding.
9The Appendix contains a proof showing that if α′ = e−αcˆp¯−cˆ , it must hold that
e−cˆ
p¯−cˆ < α
′ < ep¯ . Hence,
the threshold α′ = e−αcˆp¯−cˆ indeed lies in the considered interval.
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3. Discussion
I will continue by analyzing various alternative modeling assumptions. First I will
analyze the impact of the two major modeling assumptions in which this paper differs
from the work of GL, namely the timing of unshrouding and the heterogeneity in add-
on profitability. Then I will continue by conducting additional robustness checks and
analyzing further model extensions.
3.1. The Impact of Timing
First consider the timing of unshrouding and assume, like GL do, that shrouding and
pricing decisions are taken simultaneously. In this case the strategic dimension of
unshrouding vanishes. Suppose firms play an equilibrium in which all firms shroud the
add-on. If any firm unilaterally deviates to unshrouding, there will be no impact on the
prices of the competing firms due to the simultaneity. Also, since the game is played
only once, there is no incentive to influence the profits made by other firms. Therefore,
the only incentive to unshroud results from its impact on the demand of the deviating
firm. It turns out that a firm will only unshroud if it sets a low add-on price such that,
as in GL, the firm uses unshrouding to inform sophisticates about its low add-on price
to prevent them from substituting. It then turns out that add-on production costs
have no effect on the result of GL.
Proposition I.2. In the game with simultaneous shrouding and pricing decisions and
heterogenous add-on profitability, there exists a shrouding equilibrium if and only if the
fraction of myopic consumers is sufficiently large: α ≥ e
p¯
.
The proof is contained in the Appendix.10
3.2. The Impact of Asymmetric Add-on Production Costs
The second key difference to GL lies in the heterogeneity of add-on production costs,
or more general, in the heterogeneity of add-on profitability. Suppose there would be
no differences in add-on profitability and all firms earn the same equilibrium profits
from add-on sales, say $1 per sold add-on. When setting their base good prices firms
know that they will make $1 extra add-on profit from each customer. Now suppose
that in a market without add-ons firms would set a price of $10 for the base good.
10For completeness note that the efficient firm 1 has a stronger incentive to deviate from shrouding.
In particular, firm 1 deviates from shrouding if α < ep¯ , while firm 2 deviates from shrouding if
α ≥ e−cˆp¯−cˆ . Since it holds that e−cˆp¯−cˆ < ep¯ , the range of parameters for which firm 2 wants to deviate
is smaller than for firm 1.
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Then, with the existence of the add-on, the equilibrium price will simply be $9 for the
base good since firms know they will get additional $1 from the add-on. In effect, the
existence of the add-on and the profits derived from add-on sales have no consequences
for total firm profits. This is the classic Chicago school argument of add-on irrelevance,
formally shown by Lal and Matutes (1994).
Indeed, when assuming that both firms are equally profitable in the add-on dimension
(e.g. cˆ = 0), firm profits would be pii =
1
2t
(t)2 = t
2
in both the shrouded and the
unshrouded subgame. It turns out the shrouding has an impact on the size of the
add-on market and on add-on profits, but it does not have an impact on total firm
profits. Therefore, firms are indifferent between shrouding or unshrouding.
3.3. Equivalence of the Model to a Repeated Play of the GL Setting
As indicated before, the results of the game with successive shrouding and pricing deci-
sions are qualitatively similar to a repeated play of the game with concurrent shrouding
and pricing. When shopping repeatedly, a consumer is likely to gain experience and to
make wiser purchase decisions. For example, if a consumer bought several overpriced
printer cartridges in the past and currently needs a new printer, she might be aware of
high add-on costs and thus take measures to avoid or reduce them. Hence, in terms of
the model, consumers are likely to maintain or even to increase their level of sophis-
tication over their lifetimes. Cruickshank (2000), for example, confronted particularly
experienced consumers with their actual bank account fees. Less than 10% of them said
that the charges for international transfers, bill paying or cash machine withdrawals
were higher than they had expected.
In terms of a repeated game setting this would mean that once myopes have been
educated, they retain their level of sophistication for future periods. Therefore, firms
would anticipate that their current shrouding decisions will have a future impact. Con-
trary to sticky consumer sophistication, firms can change prices quite flexibly, or in
terms of a model they could change them in every period. Thus, such a repeated
game setting and the incentives to unshroud are very similar to the proposed game
with successive shrouding and pricing decisions, and indeed the qualitative results are
similar.1112
11The main difference stems from a lagged reaction to equilibrium deviations. If firms play a shrouding
equilibrium and if one firm deviates, the other firm can react and change its price in the next period
at the earliest. Hence, there is a possible short-term gain from deviating, which is not present in
my model.
12This reasoning abstracts from any collusion that may arise in a repeated game.
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3.4. The Impact of Observable Add-on Prices
Another natural variation of the model would be to assume that sophisticated con-
sumers can always observe add-on prices, even if the add-on is shrouded. In this case
the only effect of unshrouding would be to turn the educatable myopes into sophis-
ticates. This seems to be a natural extension to my model since firms decide about
unshrouding before prices are set and hence might not be able to inform consumers
about particular add-on prices. As before, I now check whether any of the firms has
an incentive to unshroud the add-on.
First note that if sophisticates can always observe add-on prices, firms have different
add-on pricing incentives than in the main model. Up to now, consumers in a shrouded
subgame could not observe add-on prices and hence could not condition their base
good choice on add-on prices. Thus, add-on prices had no effect on base good demand
or substitution behavior and firms had monopoly power in the add-on market over
all consumers who did not substitute. This was correctly anticipated by sophisticated
consumers who therefore engaged in substitution. This mechanism is obviously different
if sophisticates can observe add-on prices in the shrouded subgame. For example, if a
firm in a shrouded subgame sets a low add-on price e, sophisticates can observe this
and will refrain from substituting. Therefore, firms in a shrouded subgame are able
to sell the add-on to sophisticated consumers and will do so for certain parameter
constellations.
First suppose that the fraction of initially myopic consumers is low (α ≤ e−cˆ
p¯−cˆ). Then,
in a shrouded subgame both firms would set low add-on prices e and serve all consumers.
Since unshrouding always lowers the fraction of myopic consumers, firms will also set
low add-on prices in the unshrouded subgame. In both cases firms sell the add-on to all
consumers and hence are indifferent about the distribution of the consumer population.
Therefore, in this case no firm has a strict incentive to unshroud the add-on.
In all other cases ( e−cˆ
p¯−cˆ < α) the population composition has an impact on profits.
Note here that profits are symmetric in the sense that the advantage in profits of the
efficient firm 1 is equal to the disadvantage in profits of the inefficient firm 2. Therefore,
unshrouding, by affecting the consumer population, either increases or decreases these
profit differences. Hence, for e−cˆ
p¯−cˆ < α one of the firms will have an incentive to unshroud
the add-on.13 The efficient firm 1 will unshroud if this increases the differences in profits,
while the inefficient firm 2 will unshroud if this decreases the profit differences.14 This
13As in the main model, there exists one knife-edge case in which firms are indifferent, namely α > ep¯
with α′ = e−αcˆp¯−cˆ .
14Note that, as before, the assumption cˆ < 3t suffices to ensure positive profits for the inefficient
firm 2.
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leads to the following proposition:
Proposition I.3. If sophisticates can always observe add-on prices, there exists a
shrouding equilibrium if and only if
α ≤ e− cˆ
p¯− cˆ with α
′ < α or α >
e
p¯
with α′ =
e− αcˆ
p¯− cˆ .
The proof is contained in the Appendix. With exception of the knife-edge case
α′ = e−αcˆ
p¯−cˆ , there only exists a shrouding equilibrium if the fraction of myopic consumers
is low enough (α ≤ e−cˆ
p¯−cˆ). Again, this result stands in contrast to the findings of GL who
conclude that firms do not unshroud the add-on if the fraction of myopic consumers is
large enough (α > e
p¯
).
Note that for the constellations in which a shrouding equilibrium exists (α ≤ e−cˆ
p¯−cˆ)
both firms set low add-on prices e. Thus, firms will only refrain from unshrouding
if they are not exploiting myopic consumers anyway. For all other cases in which at
least one firm would set a high add-on price in the shrouded subgame, one firm will
unshroud the add-on. In other words, there does not exist a shrouding equilibrium in
which shrouding has negative consequences for myopic consumers.
3.5. The Impact of Unobservable Add-on Prices
I have assumed in the main model that a firm can reveal add-on prices before they are
fixed. For instance, a firm could commit itself in advance to reveal its add-on price, for
example by creating a website that transparently displays all fees charged by the firm.
However, it might not always be reasonable to assume that the firm can also commit
itself to reveal the add-on prices of the other firms. In terms of the model this would
mean that unshrouding only reveals the add-on price of the firm that unshrouds.
The intuition and the qualitative results for this case are basically the same as in the
main model. Firms have an incentive to strategically manipulate the composition of
the consumer population in order to soften competition in the base good market. Due
to this logic, at least one firm will have an incentive to unshroud the add-on. The only
difference to the result of the main model is that firms potentially have an additional
incentive to unshroud the add-on. This additional incentive to unshroud stems from
the fact that if a firm has set a low add-on price e, it wants to inform consumers about
it to prevent them from substituting. It will turn out that due to this reasoning there
exist cases in which both firms have an incentive to unshroud the add-on.
To prove this result we first have to determine consumer expectations about the
add-on prices of shrouding firms. Suppose that a firm did not unshroud and therefore
its add-on price is unobservable. In this case, consumer decisions are independent of
the unobservable add-on price and the firm has monopoly power in the add-on market.
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As argued before, this implies that a shrouding firm will set an add-on price p¯, which
will be correctly anticipated by sophisticated consumers.
Now let us compare the pricing alternatives of firms and the corresponding optimal
shrouding behavior. Suppose both firms set low add-on prices e. If both firms do so,
they will unshroud since they want to inform sophisticates about their low add-on price
to prevent substitution. The resulting profits are piU11 and pi
U1
2 . Now consider the case
in which firms set add-on prices pˆ1 = e and pˆ2 = p¯. This can only be an equilibrium if
firm 1 unshrouds, thereby disclosing its add-on price and also educating the educatable
myopes. The resulting profits are piU21 and pi
U2
2 .
15 The last possibility is that both firms
set high add-on prices pˆ1 = pˆ2 = p¯. If no firm unshrouds, profits will be equal to pi
S
1
and piS2 . If any firm decides to unshroud, profits will be pi
U3
1 and pi
U3
2 .
It follows that in equilibrium at least one firm has an incentive to unshroud the add-
on. The easiest way to see this is by observing that firms can make the same profits
as in the main model, namely piU1i , pi
U2
i , pi
U3
i , or pi
S
i . By applying the same calculations
as in the main model it holds that at least one firm has an incentive to deviate from
a shrouding-strategy. Hence, as before, there does not exist a shrouding equilibrium.
Note that, as said before, it might be the case that both firms have a strict incentive
to unshroud the add-on. For example, if there are very few uneducatable myopes, then
both firms set low add-on prices e in equilibrium and both firms wish to unshroud in
order to inform consumers of their add-on prices and prevent substitution.
3.6. The Impact of Specific Demand Frameworks
Until now I have assumed that firms compete via Hotelling competition. This assump-
tion is more specific than in the model of GL who use a more general form of price
competition with an arbitrary number of firms. Due to their symmetry assumptions,
they are able to calculate equilibrium profits for very general forms of demand func-
tions. However, to account for asymmetries, I had to use a more specific demand
function. Using the Hotelling framework allowed me to calculate equilibrium profits
in the given setting, which were then used to determine which firm wants to unshroud
the add-on for given parameter constellations. I will now argue that the result that
at least one firm has an incentive to unshroud the add-on is not an artefact of the
Hotelling framework. I will first argue that the result transfers to other frameworks
of duopolistic pricing competition. Then I will show that the result also transfers to
competition between a larger number of firms.
The central assumption that both GL and I use is that each consumer buys exactly
15I am focusing on cases with pˆ1 ≤ pˆ2. It is straightforward to check that a case with pˆ1 = p¯ and
pˆ2 = e cannot be an equilibrium.
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one unit of the base good. This assumption leads to Lemma I.1, namely that firms
will choose add-on prices only from the set {e, p¯}. Hence, sophisticates anticipate to
pay min{pˆi, e} = e for the add-on or substitution. Myopes do not consider the add-on,
or equivalently, anticipate that it is costless. Hence, for both consumer groups the
anticipated costs for the add-on or substitution are equal for all firms. It follows that
add-on pricing has no effect on the demand for the base good.
Given Lemma I.1, it follows that if firms are symmetric, the Chicago school argument
of Lal and Matutes (1994) applies. Hence, all add-on revenues are used to subsidize
the base good and the existence of the add-on has no impact on equilibrium profits.
However, this is different if firms are asymmetric. A firm that has a comparative ad-
vantage in the add-on market will have higher equilibrium profits than a firm with a
comparative disadvantage. However, the add-on revenues of the firms will still be influ-
enced by the composition of the consumer population or, respectively, by the shrouding
decisions of the firms. Hence, depending on parameter values, unshrouding will either
increase or decrease competitive differences. On the basis of the same argument as in
the main model this means that if both firms make positive equilibrium profits, one
of them has an incentive to unshroud the add-on. In particular, the efficient firm will
unshroud if this increases competitive differences while otherwise the inefficient firm
will unshroud.
Now I can argue that this reasoning holds for a general number of firms. Suppose
several asymmetric firms compete in prices. Firms sell both a base good and an add-
on and, as before, every consumer buys exactly one unit of the base good. Due to
their asymmetries, some firms will have a comparative advantage in the add-on market
while others will have a comparative disadvantage. As before, an inefficient firm would
unshroud if this decreases its comparative disadvantage. Similarly, an efficient firm
would unshroud if this increases its comparative advantage.16 Again, at least one firm
has an incentive to unshroud the add-on.
3.7. Further Remarks
Still, several potential strategies are neglected in the above analysis. For example,
in reality firms can voluntarily bind themselves to certain terms, i.e. a bank could
advertise that its monthly fees for its current accounts will be kept at zero for the
next two years. With such a commitment the bank would discard its ability to react to
16This reasoning holds as long as at least two firms make positive equilibrium profits and unshroud-
ing does not change the number of firms that make positive equilibrium profits. If unshrouding
increases the number of firms that participate in the market, the incentive to unshroud might be
weakened.
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actions of its competitors, and hence the competitors would have less scope for strategic
maneuvering.17 Another possible extension of the model is to allow for the invention of
new products. Hence, once consumers start to understand certain products, they can
be replaced by new products which customers do not yet understand. For example,
Carlin and Manso (2011) base a model on this idea. Another extension of the presented
model could be to allow for heterogeneous products, which would make it harder for
consumers to understand all available products.18
4. Review of the Literature
This paper contributes to the growing literature of Behavioral Industrial Organization
(see Spiegler (2011) for an overview). In particular, this paper studies the impact
of limited consumer attention on firm incentives and behavior. Other papers that
specifically study limited consumer attention in an Industrial Organization context are
GL (2006), Armstrong and Chen (2009), Carlin (2009), Wilson (2010), Carlin and
Manso (2011), and Ellison and Wolitzky (2011).
My work builds on the paper by GL, which discusses the impact of consumer myopia
in add-on markets. Firms can costlessly unshroud and thereby reveal add-on prices
and increase the fraction of informed consumers. GL show that there exist equilibria
in which firms will not unshroud. The innovation in my work lies in allowing for a
strategic dimension of unshrouding with wide-ranging implications on the results of
the model.
Armstrong and Chen (2009) present a model in which some consumers know prod-
uct prices, but are unaware of product qualitities. The authors show that firms will
engage in both price and quality dispersion. However, the model of Armstrong and
Chen (2009) does not allow firms to influence the level of consumer sophistication. In
contrast, the models of Carlin (2009) and Carlin and Manso (2011) allow for such an
influence of consumer sophistication. In their models, one part of the consumer pop-
ulation can observe prices and can therefore choose the cheapest firm. The remaining
consumers cannot observe prices and randomly buy from any firm. The exact popula-
tion distribution is dependent on the obfuscatory efforts of firms. Due to the existence
of the uninformed consumers firms can sell overpriced products to them. The profit
created by this conduct increases with the fraction of inattentive consumers, which
17Note that such a model of price-commitment would be related to a Stackelberg-game in which one
firm moves before the other. In this case each firm would have an incentive to be the first mover,
regardless of whether or not this includes educating the consumer population.
18For example, some banks offer to exchange domestic currencies into foreign currencies while other
banks offer to exchange domestic currencies into Travelers Cheques.
Strategic Product Placement and Pricing in Markets with Inattentive Consumers 23
consequently creates an incentive to increase the fraction of these consumers. This
incentive to obfuscate is different in my model since, although the add-on is potentially
overpriced, the exploitation in the add-on dimension is competed away in the base good
dimension. Hence, in my model the incentive for shrouding does not stem from the aim
to create a large group of consumers which can be exploited, but from the incentive to
strategically increase or decrease the competitive advantages between firms.
Both Wilson (2010) and Ellison and Wolitzky (2011) show that obfuscatory equilibria
exist in search-theoretic frameworks. Both works assume that it is costly for some
consumers to learn the price of a firm. The authors show that this creates incentives
for firms to increase the search costs that consumers incur. This can be interpreted as
an attempt to increase obfuscation. However, the applied search-theoretic frameworks
are very different from the model of pricing competition applied in this paper.
Work on add-on pricing has been conducted by Lal and Matutes (1994), Shapiro
(1995), and Ellison (2005). Lal and Matutes (1994) formalize the classic Chicago school
argument, arguing that profits earned with add-ons are competed away at the base good
level. This leads to their “irrelevance result”, which is also present in the model of GL,
stating that the existence of the add-on has no impact on the profits of symmetric firms.
This effect is not present in my model since the differences in add-on profitability lead to
differences in firm profits. Shapiro (1995) argues that firms in markets with shrouded
add-ons will always have an incentive to unshroud because this attracts customers.
The central difference to my work is the availability of a substitution which offsets this
particular customer-winning effect of unshrouding. Ellison (2005) models an add-on
market in which consumers have heterogenous valuations for quality. The author then
shows that add-ons can be used to price-discriminate between the consumer types. In
an extension Ellison also proposes a behavioral interpretation of the assumed consumer
characteristics, which was an inspiration for the work of GL.
5. Conclusion
I have shown that shrouding is not sustainable in a competitive market environment
when firms exhibit heterogeneity in add-on profitability. Firms use unshrouding as a
strategic device to alter their own demand structures and the ones of their competitors,
thereby creating advantages for themselves. This strategic incentive arises from the
intention to enhance or to mitigate competititive (dis)advantages. The incentive to
unshroud the add-on depends on the population composition and, in particular, on the
percentage of myopic consumers who cannot be educated by unshrouding. Dependent
on this population composition either the efficient or the inefficient firm has an incentive
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to unshroud the add-on. For both cases there exist anecdotal examples which fit into
the derived logic.
The model applies to market situations in which pricing is more flexible than con-
sumer education or to situations in which a purchase decision is repeated over a con-
sumer’s lifetime. What is left out in the model are costs of unshrouding, which natu-
rally decrease the incentive to educate consumers. Hence, unshrouding is likely to be
observed in markets with significant differences in profitability between firms and in
markets with relatively cheap unshrouding mechanisms.
II. Collusive Shrouding and
Cartelization
We investigate the impact of consumer myopia on competition
and firm behavior. In our model, firms repeatedly sell a primary
good and a respective add-on. We study the impact of consumer
myopia in the add-on market on pricing and on the ability of
firms to engage in collusion. We show that in a situation in
which firms cartelize and charge monopoly prices, limited atten-
tion makes deviation from such collusive behavior less reward-
ing and hence facilitates collusion. In particular, we determine
the incentives of firms to educate consumers. We find that a
shrouded market in which no firm educates consumers is a sign
for cartelization. Hence, if obfuscation is observed in a market,
it can serve as a proxy signal for illegal industry agreements.
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1. Introduction
In many markets product information is not easily available and consumers have diffi-
culties when trying to collect the information that is relevant for their shopping deci-
sions. In the terminology of the literature, building on the seminal paper of Gabaix and
Laibson (2006), these are termed shrouded markets. Firms that participate in these
markets can either foster or alleviate the degree of obfuscation. In the economic liter-
ature there is ongoing debate about what firms should do in such a situation. Gabaix
and Laibson (2006) argue in a model of add-on markets that firms will not reveal add-
on prices if there are enough myopic consumers, i.e. if there are enough consumers that
do not incorporate all information that is available to them. In their model, if any
firm unshrouds the add-on, some of the myopic consumers get educated and add-on
prices get revealed. However, it turns out that the education of consumers does not
have any strategic effect in their model since it happens so late that it does not have
any impact on the game and on the incentives of the competing firms. Dahremo¨ller
(forthcoming) picks up this point and shows that, if the education of consumers has
strategic implications for the game, firms rather have an incentive to unshroud the
add-on.
We further expand this framework by designing an infinitely repeated game in which
consumer education is a strategic variable in the sense that it has an effect on the
payoffs and strategies of firms. We show that the natural equilibrium1 of the game
is one in which firms set competitive prices and unshroud the add-on. However, for
sufficiently high discount factors there also exists an equilibrium in which firms collude
on monopoly pricing. In particular, if all consumers are sophisticated and if the discount
factor is high enough, firms can collude on monopoly pricing.
One of our central findings is that the existence of myopic consumers makes the
collusive equilibrium more stable in the sense of lowering the critical discount factor
for which collusion is sustainable. In terms of the model this implies that, dependent
on the market constellation, firms have an incentive not to unshroud the add-on in
order to keep the fraction of myopic consumers high enough for collusion to be stable.
In addition, even if collusion is already stable, shrouding increases monopoly profits.
The fact that shrouding makes collusion more stable and, in many cases, is even a
prerequisite for collusion has strong implications for competition analysis and antitrust
regulations. First, since, dependent on parameter constellations, shrouding is a re-
quirement for collusion, the regulator might intervene to decrease market obfuscation
in order to destabilize collusion. Second, since again shrouding might be a requirement
1The term ’natural equilibrium’ refers to an equilibrium in which firms play the equilibrium strategy
of a respective one-shot game in each period of the game.
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for collusion, the degree of obfuscation in a market might be a proxy signal for ongoing
collusion in the market. Hence, since it is usually difficult to detect agreements on col-
lusive pricing, it might be helpful for the regulator to consider the degree of obfuscation
as an additional indicator for collusion.
One example of firms that coordinated on intransparency with regard to their prod-
ucts was the Lombard Club, which was a cartel of Austrian banks that was detected
by the European Commision (see European Commission 2004). For example, at a
meeting of the involved banks in 1994 “everyone agreed that, if questioned by the press
or by the Association for Consumer Information for rate comparison purposes, they
should in future stick to communicating only the (official) rates posted at the counter
and not answer any further questions.” In another agreement in 1996, the involved
banks coordinated on valuing and pricing their portfolio lists only in Austrian Schilling
while dropping any reference to the Euro. It is documented that the involved banks
agreed that valuing and pricing in both Euro and Austrian Schilling would be more
transparent to consumers, but they deemed that competition in this dimension should
be avoided. In 1999 the involved banks agreed not to publicize a comparison of their
savings products since this would open a way to “fresh competition.”
More evidence for the connection between shrouding and collusive profits is presented
by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1998) for the U.S. airlines industry. In 1992, from
an initial situation in which all pricing schemes in the industry were rather opaque
and intransparent, American Airlines started a new pricing scheme “which emphasizes
simplicity and equity and value.” Its competitor United Airlines responded within
forty-eight hours and in the following all other major competitors also quickly adopted
simplified pricing schemes. Just three days later, another competitor, Trans World
Airlines, revised its pricing schedule and severely undercut industry prices, which was
again followed by quick price cuts of all major competitors. This example indicates
that there might be a close relationship between the increase of transparency by the
first firm and the following cascades of increased transparency and price cuts by the
other firms in the market. This linkage between obfuscation and pricing will also be
present in our results.
In our model, we analyze markets for goods whose total price consists of more than
one element, for example markets for a base good and an add-on. If both the base
good and the add-on are consumed, the effective total price of the product bundle is
the sum of both prices. For instance, if a consumer considers buying a printer, she will
not only have to pay the immediate price for the printer, but most likely have future
expenses for compatible refill cartridges. Another application for our framework are
goods that trigger future payments, for example subscriptions for which the total price
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is the (discounted) sum of all payments.
If a consumer wants to correctly calculate the effective total price of the product
bundle, she needs to possess all relevant information and therefore a high degree of
attention. If the attention of the consumer is limited though, she possibly does not
fully recognize the effective total price. Consumers that exhibit this bias are called
myopic consumers. As a result of their myopia, they may not be able to make rational
consumption decisions. For example, Cruickshank (2000) reports that users of a current
account seldomly fully understand all details of the contract and in most cases pay only
little attention to add-on fees or other contract specifications. In line with these findings
are the results from a survey considering consumer empowerment in the European
Union which was conducted by TNS (2011). Addressing the question whether European
citizens are sufficiently empowered as consumers, it is reported that almost six out of
ten interviewees did not fully read the terms and conditions of the latest service contract
that they signed (including contracts for gas, electricity, mobile phones, bank accounts,
or insurances). Building on these results we assume that the consumer population
contains a positive fraction of myopic consumers.
Considering such markets, it seems reasonable to assume that firms can exert some
influence on the degree of obfuscation. Note here that in many markets there is little
scope for obfuscation in the base good market since transparency in this dimension
is necessary to attract consumers to the market. This is different for add-on markets
which usually offer greater possibilities for firms to shroud information and prices. In
our model, if all firms shroud the add-on, a fraction of α ∈ (0, 1] consumers is myopic
and does not consider the add-on price. If any firm unshrouds the add-on, all myopic
consumers get educated and behave like the sophisticated consumers for the current
and all future rounds of the game.2 In contrast to Gabaix and Laibson (2006) and
Dahremo¨ller (forthcoming) we assume that the total demand for the product bundle is
not fixed. Instead, consumers have a personal valuation for the product bundle, which is
heterogenous over the consumer population. If the valuation of a consumer is lower than
the anticipated price of the product bundle, she will prefer not to buy. Note here that
for given prices the total demand is higher if there are myopic consumers than if there
are only sophisticated consumers. This is because myopic consumers underestimate
the total price of the product bundle and hence are more likely to participate in the
market.
Our main finding is that the existence of myopic consumers facilitates collusion. In
2Note here that we abstract from the possibility that firms can actively increase the fraction of
myopic consumers α. In reality it seems reasonable that firms can somehow increase α. While we
do not explicitly model this possibility, it will turn out that if a shrouding equilibrium exists, firms
will have an incentive to increase α.
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terms of the model this implies that the critical discount factor for which collusion
is stable is decreasing in the fraction of myopic consumers. The main driver of this
finding is the fact that a deviation from collusion is less rewarding if many consumers
are myopic. To get an intuition for this result consider a situation in which firms
collude on monopoly pricing. In a model with only sophisticated consumers a firm
that deviates and undercuts the collusive price attracts all consumers in the market
and earns the entire monopoly profits. This is different if some consumers are myopic.
Suppose first that a firm deviates by only lowering its price. Then myopic consumers
do not perceive the change in the price and therefore will not switch to the deviating
firm. Suppose second that a firm deviates by lowering its price and by unshrouding
the add-on. Such a deviation would attract all consumers that still participate in the
market, but would lower the total demand since some myopes realize that prices are
higher than they anticipated. Both these effects make a deviation from collusion less
rewarding and hence collusion is more stable. In other words, the existence of myopic
consumers facilitates collusion.
In addition, even if collusion is already stable for a given population composition,
firms have an incentive to continue increasing the fraction of myopic consumers. Since
myopic consumers underestimate the total price of the product bundle, shrouding may
trick these consumers into consumption. Hence, the total demand for the product
bundle and the profits of the firms are rising with the fraction of myopic consumers.
Our analysis also yield several insights on welfare. If the consumers valuation for the
product bundle is too low, a decision to buy the product bundle is inefficient and will
be regretted by the consumer ex post. Therefore we find that shrouding has a negative
impact on consumer welfare. This result has implications when applying our results
to a regulatory perspective. We find that a regulatory intervention with the aim to
unshroud the add-on is increasing total welfare if it can lower the fraction of myopic
consumers α sufficiently. In addition, we find that a regulation to unshroud the add-on
is always increasing the consumer surplus.
When considered from a regulatory perspective, our results suggest that regulatory
tools with the aim to unshroud the add-on can impede collusion. If a regulatory
intervention can decrease the fraction of myopic consumers α sufficiently, collusion
can potentially be prevented or destabilized. Examples for such intervention would
be informational campaigns to increase consumer sophistication or regulations that
enhance market transparency. Even if such efforts to unshroud cannot decrease the
fraction of myopic consumers α sufficiently in order to prevent collusion, they still
increase consumer welfare as they either prevent consumers from making irrational
choices or decrease the prices that consumers pay for the product bundle.
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In addition to suggesting tools to impede collusion, our results also suggest new
tools to detect collusion. We find that in many parameter constellations shrouding is
necessary for collusion to be stable. Hence, a shrouded market is a potential indica-
tor for illegal industry agreements. These markets then are candidates for increased
scrutiny and inspections by governmental trustbusters. Traditional antitrust provisions
like unannounced inspections or leniency policies were used in order to detect, prove,
and prevent collusive industry behavior. However, historic evidence suggests that these
tools were only partly successful in preventing collusion and cartelization. In particular,
unannounced inspections and leniency policies were mostly targeted at disintegrating
existing cartels. Our results suggest a new approach to detect active and intact cartels
and prevent future cartel formation.
The remainder of this paper will proceed as follows. In Section 2 we give a short
overview over the related literature. In Section 3 we present the main analysis and
results. Section 4 will conclude.
2. Review of the Literature
The economic discourse on information disclosure by competitive firms was started
by Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981). In their works rational consumers are im-
perfectly informed about product attributes and firms can credibly reveal the missing
information. Within this framework, the authors show that competitive firms indeed
have an incentive to reveal the missing information since this has a positive effect on
their demands and profits.
One of the first works on obfuscation in add-on markets is provided by Shapiro
(1995). He argues that there does not exist an equilibrium in which firms shroud the
add-on. Shapiro argues verbally that there is a customer winning effect of unshrouding,
which implies that a shrouding equilibrium is not stable.
Gabaix and Laibson (2006) were the first to question that view. Building on the
work of Shapiro (1995), they use a model of add-on markets and assume that a given
fraction of myopic consumers does not consider the add-on price in their purchase
decisions. However, each firm can educate the myopic consumers and thereby help
them to make more sophisticated decisions. The authors show that if the fraction of
myopic consumers is large enough, there exists an equilibrium in which no firm has an
incentive to educate consumers and all firms shroud the add-on.
This point is picked up by Dahremo¨ller (forthcoming) who shows that the results of
Gabaix and Laibson (2006) are strongly based on their modeling of unshrouding. In
particular, Gabaix and Laibson (2006) use a single-period model in which firms can
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unshroud only in the last stage of the game. This implies that if any firm unshrouds the
add-on, the other firms cannot react to this deviation. Also, unshrouding has no impact
on any future payoffs since the game ends at this point. In terms of the model this
implies that the education of consumers has no consequence for the play of the game
and for the strategies of firms.3 Examining these effects, Dahremo¨ller (forthcoming)
shows that if the education of consumers is modeled to have strategic implications for
the game, a shrouding equilibrium no longer exists.
If one would transfer the framework of Gabaix and Laibson (2006) to a repeated
game, unshrouding would have only short-term effects, while any long-term effects
would be neglected. However, in our model we will follow Dahremo¨ller (forthcoming)
by assuming that unshrouding has long-term implications. Examples for long-term
effects of consumer education include that firms condition their behavior on the play
of the previous rounds and include that unshrouding permanently alters the consumer
structure in future periods.
Kosfeld and Schu¨wer (2010) analyze the framework of Gabaix and Laibson (2006)
from a regulatory perspective. They show that a regulatory intervention with the aim
to increase consumer education can have positive as well as negative effects on welfare.
3. The Model
3.1. Model Setup
We model an infinitely repeated game. In each period n ≥ 3 symmetric firms produce
a base good and an add-on at zero costs. Each firm i sets a base-good price pi and an
add-on price pˆi. The common discount factor of firms is δ ∈ [0, 1]. The consumer pop-
ulation has mass 1 and consists of α ∈ (0, 1] myopic consumers and 1−α sophisticated
consumers. The fraction of myopic consumers only considers the base good prices pi
and neglects the add-on prices pˆi. The remaining fraction of sophisticated consumers
is fully informed, rational, and considers both the base good prices pi and the add-on
prices pˆi. We assume that there exists a maximum price p¯ for the add-on which can be
interpreted as the cost of a last minute substitution or a regulatory usury ceiling.
As outlined before, we assume that in each period each firm can unshroud the add-
on. If one firm does so, the myopic consumers get educated, which means that they
behave like sophisticated consumers for the current round and all remaining rounds
of the game. Consumers derive utility v from consuming one unit of the base good
3In essence, Gabaix and Laibson (2006) show that firms potentially do not have an incentive to reveal
their add-on prices. This result holds irrespective of whether this revelation of add-on prices is
linked to an education of the consumer population.
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and the respective add-on in a given period. If a consumer abstains from buying the
product bundle, she gets zero utility. Each consumer buys at most one unit of the base
good and one unit of the add-on. The “realized” utility of consumers is U = v−pi− pˆi.
However, myopic consumers mistakenly anticipate to get a utility from buying at firm
i of Um = v − pi. Hence, the myopic consumers do not anticipate their future need
for the add-on or, equivalently, anticipate that the add-on price is zero. In contrast,
sophisticated consumers correctly anticipate that their utility from buying at firm i
is U s = v − pi − pˆi. The consumption utility v of each consumer is stochastic with
v ∼ U [0, v]. The cdf of v then takes the following form:
F (z) =

0 if z ≤ 0,
z
v
if 0 < z < v,
1 if v ≤ z.
Since firms compete via Bertrand competition, a consumer buys the bundle at the
firm that yields her the highest anticipated utility. If there are several firms that yield
the highest anticipated utility, the consumer will choose any one of them with equal
probability. In addition, if no firm yields positive anticipated utility, the consumer
abstains from buying. The well known result of a one-period game with Bertrand
competition is that firms earn zero profits. However, the infinite repetition of a game
usually allows for a plethora of equilibria and firm strategies4 and there exists no general
mechanism for equilibrium selection. However, in the following, we assume that if firms
collude on prices or on shrouding, they will coordinate on the equilibrium that yields
the highest profit per firm.5 In particular, since firms are symmetric, we focus only on
these collusive equilibria that yield the highest aggregate firm profit and assume that
this will be split equally among the colluding firms.
One implication of the existence of myopic consumers is that firms have an incentive
to set high add-on prices along with low base good prices. To see this recall the
utility functions Um and U s. For given prices pi and pˆi, a firm can always increase the
attractiveness of its product bundle for myopics while leaving the attractiveness of the
bundle for sophisticates unchanged. The firm can achieve this by lowering the base
good price pi by a small amount and increasing the add-on price pˆi by the same small
amount.
However, this logic of lowering base good prices and raising add-on prices is poten-
tially limited. The reason is that there are several arguments that lead to a lower bound
4See, for example, Fudenberg and Maskin (1986).
5We will later show that an equilibrium with less-than-optimal profits would not be more stable in
terms of collusion. Hence, there is no obvious reason for firms to collude on less-than-optimal
profits.
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for base good prices. For example, in real-world markets, base good prices cannot be
negative due to potential arbitrage opportunities. If consumers receive money for the
purchase of a good, they will buy as many units of the good as they can, creating
unlimited profits for themselves and a loss for the firm that sells the good. In addition
to the condition that prices must be non-negative, there potentially also exist reasons
for positive lower price limits. One reason for a lower price bound is the possibility to
resell parts of the base good. For instance, if consumers could buy a printer at zero
costs and sell the copper wires or other parts of the printer for a profit, they might
exploit this as an arbitrage opportunity. Another argument for price boundaries in
the base good dimension is brought forward by Miao (2010) who argues that if the
base good and the add-on are substitutes, there will be a lower limit for the base good
price. Printers, for example, are sold with a starting cartridge. If a cartridge runs low,
the consumer has the choice between buying a new cartridge or buying a new printer
that is already equipped with a new starting cartridge. If the printer is very cheap
compared to the refill cartridge, firms will not be able to sell their high priced refills.
Miao (2010) shows that this creates a lower limit for the base good price.
Following the above argumentation, we impose a lower bound for the base good price.
For simplicity we set this limit to 0. We will later show that this lower bound for the
base good is reached if the following condition holds:
Assumption II.1. v ≤ p¯.
We will assume this condition to hold for the remainder of the paper. Note that
the assumption of a lower bound for the base good price creates results that stand in
contrast to the traditional Chicago school argument on add-on pricing. Formalized,
for example, by Lal and Matutes (1994) and Gabaix and Laibson (2006), the Chicago
school argument reckons that high profits in the add-on dimension are fully competed
away in the base good dimension. So suppose that, in a market with only a base
good, firms would charge an equilibrium price of p†. Now suppose that an add-on
is introduced, yielding an equilibrium add-on price of pˆ†. Then the Chicago school
argument predicts that the new base good price will simply be the old base good price
minus the new add-on price, i.e. p† − pˆ†. In other words, the Chicago school argument
predicts that the base good fully subsidizes the add-on. Obviously, such a cross-product
subsidization is not always possible if a lower boundary for the base good price exists.
3.2. Analysis
To determine the effect of the existence of myopic consumers we now want to compare
a situation in which all consumers are sophisticated to a situation in which a fraction
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of α > 0 consumers is myopic. We will then show that equilibria exist in which firms
collude on shrouding. In particular, there exist constellations in which shrouding is
necessary to allow firms to cartelize and thereby to jointly earn monopoly profits.6
Only Sophisticated Consumers
First suppose that all consumers are sophisticated. Sophisticates take both the base
good prices and the add-on prices into account. We now want to determine for which
parameter constellations firms can cartelize. If firms can coordinate on monopoly
pricing, they will set monopoly prices pM and pˆM and earn aggregate monopoly profits
piM . The profits piM are split up equally between the firms such that each firm earns
a profit of 1
n
piM . If a firm expects to earn 1
n
piM for all future periods, the present
value of these cash flows is pi
M
n(1−δ) . If any firm deviates from monopoly behavior and
undercuts marginally, it will attract all consumers and make a deviation profit of pidev.
Since the deviating firm can undercut the monopoly prices only marginally and thereby
attract all consumers, it would earn a deviation profit of the entire monopoly profits
pidev = piM . This deviation will trigger a grim-trigger punishment by the other firms.7
Hence, after such a deviation collusion breaks down and from that point onwards firms
will compete via Bertrand competition and make zero equilibrium profits piNC = 0 for
all following periods (NC=non-collusive). The present value of the cash flows after
deviation hence is pidev + δpi
NC
1−δ . Now we want to determine the critical discount factor,
which is the discount factor for which firms are indifferent between sticking to collusion
and deviating from collusion. Applying our results, the critical discount factor is given
by the solution of the following equation:
piM
n
1− δ = pi
dev +
δpiNC
1− δ (II.1)
⇒ δ∗ = n−
piM
pidev
n
=
n− 1
n
.
Thus, for all discount factors δ ≥ δ∗ collusion is sustainable.8
6Note here that the main focus of our model is to test whether market obfuscation facilitates collusion.
It may be the case that there exist other equilibria, which are not considered in our model, in which
firms do not coordinate on prices but still shroud the add-on.
7See, for example, Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for a detailed discussion of grim-trigger strategies.
8Note here that a cooperation would not be more stable if firms would coordinate on profits that
are lower than the monopoly profits. A deviating firm can always earn the aggregate collusion
profit by undercutting marginally. Examining condition (II.1), there exists no coordination on
lower-than-optimal profits that makes a deviation less rewarding. Furthermore, coordinating on
higher prices than in the monopoly case does not help either since this would destabilize collusion
as a deviating firm could undercut and set monopoly prices, thereby earning higher than collusive
profits.
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The Impact of Myopic Consumers
Now suppose that a fraction of α > 0 consumers is myopic. Recall that, in contrast
to sophisticated consumers, myopes do not consider the add-on prices pˆi. If all firms
cooperate and charge prices p and pˆ, their aggregate profit is given by:
piM(p, pˆ) = [α (1− F (p)) + (1− α)(1− F (p+ pˆ))](p+ pˆ).
It follows that if firms collude, they will set the base good price equal to its lower
bound:
Lemma II.1. Suppose v ≤ p¯ holds. Then colluding firms will set their base good price
at its lower bound, i.e. pM = 0.
The proof is contained in the Appendix. The intuition for this result is as follows.
Suppose that firms set prices such that some sophisticates still participate in the market
(p+ pˆ < v). Then for every base good price p > 0, the firms have an incentive to lower
the base good price p and to increase the add-on price pˆ. This would leave the total
bundle price and the demand from sophisticates unchanged, but would increase the
demand from myopic consumers. Suppose in contrast that firms set prices such that
no sophisticated consumer participates in the market (p + pˆ > v). Then in turns out
that the add-on is profitable enough such that firms do not want to decrease demand
by increasing the price of the base good.
Applying the result of Lemma II.1 to the aggregate profit function yields the following
collusive profit:
piM(pˆ) = [α + (1− α)(1− F (pˆ))]pˆ.
In the following analysis we have to distinguish between an ’inner solution’ in which
both types of consumers buy the product bundle (pˆ < v, F (pˆ) < 1) and a ’corner
solution’ in which only myopic consumers buy the product bundle (pˆ ≥ v, F (pˆ) = 1).
If we have an inner solution, both consumer groups have positive demand for the
product bundle and the product bundle yields positive utility to some consumers. In
contrast, the corner solution is characterized by an add-on price pˆ that, if it would be
fully considered, exceeds every consumer’s valuation. In this case only myopics possibly
consume the product bundle.
Now we want to derive the global maximum of the profit function. First suppose
that firms play an inner solution. Then, the aggregate profit of firms takes the following
form:
piM(pˆ) =
[
α + (1− α)
(
1− pˆ
v
)]
pˆ.
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The aggregate profit is maximized by charging the monopoly price pˆM = v
2(1−α) . Given
this price, profits are given by
piMinner =
v
4(1− α) . (II.2)
Now consider the corner solution with pˆM > v. In this case firms only sell the product
bundle to myopic consumers. Then the profit function of firms is given by:
piM(pˆ) = [α] pˆ.
Obviously, it is optimal to charge the highest possible add-on price pˆM = p¯, yielding a
profit of:
piMcorner = αp¯. (II.3)
It will then depend on parameter constellations whether firms will prefer the equilibrium
with the inner solution or the equilibrium with the corner solution.
Note here that the optimal price of the inner solution pˆM = v
2(1−α) is larger than the
maximum valuation v if α > 1
2
. If α > 1
2
it holds that 1− F (pˆM) = 0 and therefore no
sophisticated consumer buys the product bundle. Hence, for α > 1
2
the inner solution
is not feasible in the sense that the derived maximum does not lie in the specified
interval. If that is the case, the corner solution will be the global profit maximum.
To get an intuition for the form of the profit function we have depicted two possible
constellations in the following graphs:
Inner solution is feasible:
v p¯c
piM(pˆ)
pˆ
Inner solution is not feasible:
v
piM(pˆ)
pˆ
Figure II.1.: Two possible functional forms of the aggregate firm profits.
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For a sufficiently low share of myopic consumers
(
α ≤ 1
2
)
, the inner solution is feasible
in the sense that the profit-maximizing price of the inner solution does not exceed the
maximum valuation v. The inner solution then corresponds to the global maximum
of the profit function if the upper bound for the add-on price is not too large, i.e. if
p¯ ≤ p¯c. If, however, the fraction of myopic consumers is large enough with α > 1
2
, the
maximum of the inner solution is not feasible anymore. In this case, only the corner
solution can be optimal.
When examining the profit functions, we see that the aggregate profit for both the
inner solution and the corner solution are increasing in the fraction of myopic consumers
α. This leads to the following result:
Proposition II.1. Monopoly profits are increasing in the share of myopic consumers
α.
This finding mainly stems from the impact that myopic consumers have on the
demand function. Myopic consumers are always more likely to buy the product bundle
since they underestimate its total price. Hence, in both the inner and the corner
solution, the demand for the product bundle is increasing in the fraction of myopic
consumers. This directly implies that the monopoly profits of firms are also increasing
in the share of myopic consumers.
Now let us analyze how firms would collude and how a potential deviation strategy
would look like. If firms cartelize and coordinate on monopoly prices, they are able to
maximize aggregate profits, which will then be split up equally among them. Clearly,
all firms prefer these monopoly profits over perfect competition with zero equilibrium
profits. Nevertheless, there may be an individual short-term incentive to deviate from
monopoly pricing: A firm may deviate by either unshrouding the add-on and/or by
setting a lower or a higher price than the one that was set in the collusive phase.
Lemma II.1 implies that if a firm wants to deviate from collusion and attract further
customers, it can only do so by lowering it’s add-on price, but not by lowering its
base good price. Note that it is not obvious whether an optimal deviation involves
unshrouding the add-on. This is because unshrouding potentially has partly negative
effects since, if myopes are turned into sophisticates, they might refrain from buying
the product bundle. Therefore, for given prices, unshrouding is decreasing the demand
for the product bundle. In the following, we will show that despite its negative effect
on demand, an optimal deviation from collusion comprises unshrouding the add-on. To
see this recall that, due to low base good prices and high add-on prices, firms generate
their profit through add-on sales. Myopic consumers do not incorporate these add-on
prices into their purchase decisions. Hence, myopes do not react if the deviating firm
changes its add-on price. This creates an incentive to unshroud since, the education
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induces formerly myopic consumers to take the the change in the add-on price into
account. In the following, we will show that this effect dominates the aforementioned
reduction in demand and hence a deviating firm will unshroud the add-on.9
First note that firms will never deviate by increasing the add-on price. If firms play
a corner solution and charge the highest possible add-on price, raising the add-on price
is not feasible. If firms play an inner solution and a firm deviates by raising its add-on
price, sophisticates will prefer to buy from the other firms and only myopic consumers
buy the product bundle from the deviating firm. This is because myopes do not take the
add-on price into account and therefore will not change their behavior after a change
in the add-on price. Hence, the deviating firm will optimally set the maximum add-on
price pˆdev = p¯, yielding a deviation profit of pidev = 1
n
αp¯. It then holds that pidev ≤ 1
n
piM
and a deviation yields lower profits than the profits earned by sticking to the collusive
play.10 Therefore, increasing the add-on prices is not a profitable deviation.
We can conclude that if a firm decides to deviate, it will undercut the collusive add-on
price. Recall that it is not possible to undercut the base good price since it is already at
its lower bound. Hence, the firm can only undercut in the add-on price dimension. If a
firm undercuts the add-on price, it attracts all sophisticated consumers. In particular,
the deviant firm has two possibilities to undercut the collusive add-on price:
The first possibility is that the firm undercuts the add-on price and unshrouds the
add-on, thereby educating all myopic consumers. This lures a larger share of consumers
to the deviant firm because the fraction of price sensitive consumers has increased. At
the same time unshrouding potentially crowds many formerly myopes out of the market
because, by taking the add-on into account and learning about higher than anticipated
add-on prices, some myopes realize that they would receive negative utility from buying
and therefore decide to refrain from the market.
The deviation profit that results if a firm unshrouds the add-on takes the following
9Note here that the result that a deviating firm will always unshroud the add-on may be an artefact of
our particular population distribution. However, while this result is convenient for the analysis, it
is not necessary for our results. To get an intuition for this, recall that if the add-on is unshrouded,
firms make zero profits in the competitive equilibrium. Now suppose that firms initially collude
and any firm deviates, but does not unshroud the add-on. Then the other firms could unshroud
the add-on as part of their grim-trigger strategies. Since there are at least two firms that do so
(N ≥ 3), they have no individual incentive not to unshroud the add-on since there exists at least
one other ’punishing’ firm that still unshrouds. Hence, if any firm deviates, but does not unshroud,
the non-deviating firms will react by unshrouding the add-on and the following non-collusive profits
will again be zero.
10This result follows from the fact that we looked at a situation in which the inner solution was
optimal in the collusive play ( v4(1−α) ≥ αp¯).
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form:11
pidevi =
[
1− pˆ
dev
i
v
]
pˆdevi . (II.4)
Maximization of (II.4) yields:
pˆdevi =
v
2
.
This price is feasible regardless of the strategies that firms played in the collusive phase
since pˆdevi ≤ v and pˆdevi ≤ pˆM . Inserting the price into the profit function then yields a
deviation profit of:
pidevi =
v
4
.
The second possibility is that the firm undercuts the add-on price but decides against
unshrouding the add-on, leaving the fraction of myopic consumers at α. In this case,
the deviant firm will only attract sophisticated consumers because myopes do not take
notice of the change in the add-on price. The deviation profit in this case is equal to:
pidevi =
[α
n
+ (1− α)(1− F (pˆdevi ))
]
pˆdevi . (II.5)
If a firm deviates and decides not to educate consumers, there again could be an
’inner’ solution and a ’corner’ solution. The ’inner’ solution is the case for which
1− F (pˆdevi ) > 0. Maximization of (II.5) then yields:
pˆdevi =
v
2(1− α)
(
1− αn− 1
n
)
,
yielding a deviation profit of:
pidevi =
v
4(1− α)
(
1− αn− 1
n
)2
. (II.6)
The ’corner’ solution of the deviation is the case for which 1−F (pˆdevi ) = 0. In this case
it is optimal to set pˆdevi = p¯. The deviating firm would attract no additional consumers.
It would only attract myopic consumers such that the total demand for the firm would
be 1
n
α. This deviation might yield a higher profit than (II.6) if the upper bound on the
add-on price is extremely high. The add-on price pˆdevi = p¯ would then yield a deviation
profit of
pidevi =
αp¯
n
. (II.7)
11Note that it suffices to consider the case pˆdevi ≤ v: If a deviating firm decides to unshroud the add-
on, all consumers are sophisticated and only potentially purchase the add-on if pˆdevi ≤ v. Hence,
deviating with the corner solution cannot be optimal.
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Closer inspection of (II.7) yields that pˆdevi = p¯ can never be a profitable deviation. Note
that playing pˆdevi = p¯ and deciding not to educate consumers only corresponds to an
actual deviation from collusive behavior if the colluding firms played the inner solution
with profits of piMinner =
v
4(1−α) . It follows directly that the deviation profit (II.7) must
be lower than the shared collusive profits.12
To sum up, if a deviation is profitable, a deviating firm that unshrouds the add-on
earns a maximum deviation profit of pidev1 ≡ v4 . The maximum profit that a deviating
firm can obtain if it does not unshroud is pidev2 ≡ v4(1−α)
(
1− αn−1
n
)2
. As we show in
the Appendix it holds that pidev1 > pi
dev
2 . Hence, the following result applies:
Proposition II.2. If a profitable deviation exists, a firm that deviates from collusive
play will unshroud the add-on.
As we have mentioned above, there exist two opposing effects of unshrouding. On
the one hand, unshrouding increases the number of sophisticated consumers who notice
the deviation. On the other hand, unshrouding crowds out formerly myopic consumers.
At first glance it was not clear which of these effects is generally stronger, but now we
can argue that the positive effect dominates the negative one.
Now we want to determine the effect that the existence of myopic consumers has on
the stability of collusion. To do this we determine the critical discount factors. If firms
play an inner solution in the collusive phase, the critical discount factor is given by:
δinner =
n− 1
1−α
n
,
which is falling in the share of myopic consumers α. If collusion was characterized by
a corner solution, the critical discount factor takes the form:
δcorner =
n− 4αp¯
v
n
,
which is also falling in α. Now we want to show that the critical discount factor is
globally falling in α. Since δ is falling piecewise, it suffices to show that δ has no
’jump’ when the optimal monopoly strategy changes from the inner solution to the
corner solution. At the point of at which firms are indifferent between inner solution
and corner solution, it holds that v
4(1−α) = αp¯. Then it immediately follows that for
this parameter constellation δinner = δcorner. This suffices to ascertain that the critical
discount factor δ is continuous in α and we can conclude:
Proposition II.3. The critical discount factor δ is globally falling in the fraction of
myopic consumers α.
12To see this recall that the inner solution is only optimal in collusion if αp¯ < v4(1−α) .
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The intuition behind this finding lies in the fact that a deviation from collusion is
less rewarding with the existence of myopic consumers. First, recall that monopoly
profits and, with it, individual collusion profits are increasing in the fraction of myopic
consumers. This is because myopic consumers underestimate the price of the product
bundle and therefore are more likely to buy it. Hence, for given prices, the total demand
is increasing in α. Second, we have shown that a deviating firm optimally unshrouds
the add-on. Since then all consumers are sophisticated, total demand is independent of
α and for given prices lower than in the collusive phase. Hence, the higher the initial
share of myopic consumers, the less attractive a deviation gets when compared to the
collusive play, and therefore the more stable is collusion.
Up to now we have implicitly assumed that collusion cannot be made more stable
by coordinating on lower-than-maximal collusive profits. That this holds true was
straightforward to prove in the case with only sophisticated consumers. However, we
can show that it also holds in the case with myopic consumers.
Proposition II.4. Collusion cannot be made more stable by coordinating on other than
monopoly profits.
The proof for this result is contained in the Appendix. The basic idea is to show
that if the firms would coordinate on lower-than-optimal collusive profits, the deviation
profit would decrease sufficiently such that a deviation is not more attractive than in
the case in which firms coordinate on maximum collusive profits.
We now have established our formal results regarding the critical discount factor
δ. Now we want to discuss the resulting implications for cartel stability. As we have
shown before, the critical discount factor δ is falling in α. The central implication
of this result is that the higher the share of myopic consumers α is, the easier it
is to sustain collusion. This implies that firms may have an incentive to raise the
fraction of myopic consumers. If, initially, there does not exist a collusive equilibrium,
active shrouding can potentially decrease the critical discount factor sufficiently, such
that collusion becomes sustainable. In addition, shrouding results in higher collusive
profits and hence is beneficial for firms even if collusion is already sustainable without
additional obfuscation.
We can now conclude that in a market with a positive fraction of myopic consumers
the critical discount factor is always strictly lower than it would be if the whole con-
sumer population was sophisticated. This follows directly from the result that the
critical discount factor is globally falling in α.
Corollary II.1. The existence of myopic consumers facilitates collusion.
42 Strategic Product Placement and Pricing in Markets with Inattentive Consumers
Another result that directly follows from closer inspection of the critical discount
factors is the following:
Corollary II.2. The critical discount factor rises with the number of firms.
The result that collusion is less stable if the number of firms rises is not particularly
new. However, our results indicate that, if the number of firms has an impact on the
stability of collusion, the number of firms also has an impact on the whether or not firms
shroud the add-on. This is because a breakdown of the collusive shrouding equilibrium
leads to an unshrouding of the market. One study that supports this result is Miravete
(2007), who presents a study about the U.S. cellular telephone industry. He shows that
the entry of new firms to the market tends to ’lift the fog’ and leads to more transparent
pricing schemes. This finding is in line with our results that an increase in the number
of firms may destabilize collusion, which in turn leads to unshrouded and transparent
markets. Our results also are along the lines of Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1998)
who observed in the airline industry that one initial initiative to increase transparency
from one firm triggered a cascade of increased transparency and price cuts by all other
firms in the market. In terms of our model this can be interpreted as a deviation from
collusive play by one firm, which resulted in a punishment strategy by the other firms,
leading to a breakdown of collusion and an increase in market transparency.
3.3. Welfare Analysis and Regulatory Intervention
We will now analyze the welfare implications of potential regulatory interventions.
To answer this question we have to determine the effects that the firm behavior, in
particular shrouding the add-on, has on welfare. We argued before that the regulator
may want to prevent collusion and shrouding, but the exact effects on welfare have
not been thoroughly derived yet. In line with many previous authors like O’Donoghue
and Rabin (1999), we deem the true consumer utility to be the relevant measure of
consumer welfare. This true consumer utility stands in contrast to the anticipated
consumer utility that we interpret as determining the choice of consumers, but as
having only a distorted connection to the real utility of consumers.13
The total welfare is simply the sum of the valuations of all consumers that buy the
product bundle. The price that consumers pay for the product bundle has no impact on
welfare because it simply is a redistribution from consumer surplus to industry profit.
If all consumers buy the product bundle, for example if firms play the unshrouded com-
petitive equilibrium, welfare would be E[v] = v
2
. If, however, firms play the shrouded
13This implies that myopic consumers do not act according to their own best interest. In other words,
their myopia is not a sign of different taste, but a sign of a particular malfunction of their decision
behavior.
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collusive equilibrium, not all consumers buy the product bundle, which results in a
lower total welfare. Hence, the following Lemma applies:
Lemma II.2. The total welfare is higher in the unshrouded competitive equilibrium
than in the shrouded collusive equilibrium.
The result that shrouding is detrimental for welfare is in line with the findings of
Gabaix and Laibson (2006). Note, however, that their results stem from the assumption
that there exists a substitution that can replace the add-on. In particular, these papers
assume that the substitution is lost in terms of welfare. However, in many cases it seems
plausible that some part of its price is not completely lost.14 In this case, total welfare
would be independent of the shrouding decisions of firms.
Now we want to determine the effects of firm behavior on the consumer surplus. Ob-
viously, the case in which firms charge competitive prices is better for consumers than
the case in which firms charge monopoly prices and shroud the add-on. In addition,
the higher the fraction of myopic consumers, the higher tends to be the charged price
and the more consumers buy the product although it yields negative utility to them.
Hence, the following Lemma applies:
Lemma II.3. The consumer surplus is higher in the unshrouded competitive equilib-
rium than in the shrouded collusive equilibrium. The consumer surplus is falling in the
fraction of myopic consumers α.
The derived results have wideranging implications for regulatory policies. The most
obvious regulation would be to force firms to offer their products at marginal cost.
Needless to say, this might not be enforcable in real world markets. However, there are
other kinds of regulations that can also have positive effects on welfare. For example,
our results give new insights into the usefulness of regulations with regard to consumer
education and market transparency. The traditional reason for such regulations was
that these should enable consumers to make wiser purchase decisions, which in turn
was supposed to increase consumer welfare. Our paper presents another reason for
such regulations that, in terms of the model, are intended to reduce the fraction of
myopic consumers. If the regulator can unshroud the add-on and thereby force firms
to play the unshrouded competitive equilibrium,15 both consumer surplus and total
14Consider, for example, the case of hotel telephones. If a consumer brings her cell phone with her to
save the costs of the hotel line, the calling costs for the cell phone are not lost in terms of welfare,
but are part of third-party firm profits.
15For example, if the regulator can decrease the fraction of myopic consumers α to zero, the critical
discount factor increases to δ∗ = n−1n . Hence, if the common discount factor of firms is not
sufficiently high, unshrouding the add-on is likely to destabilize collusion.
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welfare can be increased. Note here that a regulatory intervention is also increasing the
consumer surplus if the intervention cannot decrease the fraction of myopic consumers
to zero. First, a regulatory intervention that decreases α also increases the critical
discount factor δ∗, which might make collusion infeasible. Second, even if collusion still
is stable, a regulatory intervention nevertheless increases consumer welfare since the
consumer surplus decreases in the fraction of myopic consumers.
Another innovation of our model lies in its predictions on the detection of cartels.
Traditional competition policy had to watch out for active arrangements or coordi-
nation between firms in order to detect collusive behavior. We have argued that the
level of obfuscation may be artificially increased by firms in order to stabilize collusion.
Hence, the regulator can use the degree of obfuscation in a market as a proxy for the
degree of cartelization. This relation seems a useful extension to traditional antitrust
monitoring since obfuscation is usually far easier to detect than active coordination
between firms.
Apart from active consumer education, the regulator can also intervene by reducing
barriers to entry for new firms or by employing other measures that increase the number
of firms that participate in the market. This may inhibit collusion because, as we have
shown, the critical discount factor is increasing in the number of firms.
4. Conclusion
We have proposed a model of limited attention in which competitive firms can either
shroud or unshroud the add-on market. We have shown that two kinds of equilibria
exist. In one equilibrium firms collude on monopoly pricing and shroud the add-on.
In the other equilibrium firms set prices competitively and unshroud the add-on. The
equilibrium in which firms shroud the add-on is only stable if the discount factor of the
firms is above a critical discount factor. It turns out that this critical discount factor is
decreasing in the fraction of myopic consumers. Hence, firms might try to increase the
degree of obfuscation and thereby increase the fraction of myopic consumers, which
in turn will tend to stabilize collusion. Another incentive to increase the level of
obfuscation is that the profit that firms earn when they collude is increasing in the
fraction of myopic consumers.
These results suggest several implications for welfare analysis and regulatory inter-
vention. We find that welfare is maximized if firms do not collude and do not shroud
the add-on. Hence, the regulator might employ measurements to increase consumer
sophistication. If these measurements are sufficiently efficient, the collusive equilibrium
breaks down and only the natural competitive equilibrium remains.
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Our results also suggest new insights into competition policy. We have shown that
shrouding might be used by firms as a tool to stabilize collusion. Hence, the degree
of obfuscation in a market might be a proxy for the degree of collusion and hidden
industry agreements. Markets with high obfuscation then are candidates for further
investigation by the antitrust agencies.

III. Product Lines, Product
Design, and Limited Attention
We analyze how firms design their product lines when facing cus-
tomers with limited attention. We assume that consumers sim-
plify complex decision problems by neglecting several of the rele-
vant aspects. Whether and to what extent a customer pays atten-
tion to an attribute of a product depends on the importance of the
attribute as well as its dispersion in the set of alternatives. A firm
may thus influence its customers’ attention through the range of
products it makes available. We show that a firm can increase its
profit by introducing goods that have the sole function of manip-
ulating consumer attention. We derive several results on how a
firm can profitably employ such manipulating goods. In particu-
lar, even with a homogenous consumer population our model can
explain product differentiation.
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1. Introduction
We propose a model of limited attention and analyze its implications for product de-
sign. As most consumer products have several characteristics, any purchase decision is
a complex problem of trading off advantages in some dimensions against disadvantages
in others. We posit that the way in which a decision-maker pays attention to different
aspects of the problem reflects a need to simplify such complex decisions. The resulting
attention allocation embodies both the decision-maker’s valuation of the different as-
pects of a product and the extent to which the available options (products and outside
option) differ in a dimension. We investigate how a firm optimally designs its product
line when facing customers whose attention is determined in such a way. We start with
the optimal design of a single product that is offered by a monopolist. The optimal
design will not only reflect the extent to which customers value a particular character-
istic, but will also reflect to which extent customers consider a particular attribute (the
attention allocation) and how a particular design changes this attention allocation. We
then investigate how a firm can profit from expanding its product line. We show that
there is an incentive to offer multiple products to a set of customers with homogeneous
preferences. This incentive to offer differentiated products stems from the property
that the attention allocation is determined by the choice set. Finally, we discuss the
optimal design of a product line.
We show that limited attention tends to decrease the complexity of the offered prod-
ucts. This means that products are simpler in the sense that they are equipped with
fewer features and hence are easier to grasp for consumers. One of the central propo-
sitions of the paper is that firms will offer at least two kinds of products. There is
a primary good that is intended to be sold to consumers. In addition, firms produce
what we call bait goods. These are not intended to be sold but have the sole purpose of
manipulating consumer attention in a way that is favorable to the firm.1 We find that
the optimal attention manipulation weighs the incentive to redirect attention to more
profitable attributes against the incentive to maximize the attention that is paid to
each attribute of the product. We find that, in contrast to much of the previous litera-
ture, it turns out that the firm tends to suffer from consumers having limited attention.
This is due to the fact that limited attention tends to decrease the willingness-to-pay
of consumers, which in turn lowers the price that a firm can charge for a given product.
1The assumption that a bait good is only used to manipulate consumer attention is useful to simplify
the analysis. We later present an extension in which the bait good can also be profitably sold to
some consumers. One example would be luxury goods that are sold to a small population of rich
consumers and at the same time serve as a bait good to the larger population of less wealthy
consumers.
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While customers may not fully consider the price either, we show that a firm is not
able to exploit this inattention.
In our model each product has a set of attributes. For example, a car can be equipped
with features like a sunroof, electric windows, or with certain levels of horsepower or
safety. Apart from these rather salient characteristics there are many others that are
less noticeable. Examples would be the average durability of the gear box, the seating
comfort, or the design of the cigarette lighter. Hence, such complex products like a car
have a plethora of different attributes that all add to the overall quality of the product.
Although information is freely available for lots of these attributes, consumers usually
focus on a few key variables. Such systematic neglect of important information can
arguably be classified as limited attention.
We join an emerging strand of the economic literature that incorporates such limited
attention into economic models. Gabaix (2011) develops a model of limited attention in
which the attention allocation is the solution to an optimal attention allocation prob-
lem. Our paper draws heavily on his work, as the attention allocation we assume can
be derived from an attention allocation problem with cognitive costs similar to the one
proposed by Gabaix (2011). However, our modeling of attention allocation also differs
from his approach as we employ some modified assumptions we deem appropriate to
reflect the costs of complexity. A more detailed comparison is deferred to later. In
addition, the focus of our paper are the implications of limited attention on market
outcomes like product design and price. Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2012) propose a model of
focus-weighted utility which exhibits some parallels to our model. They show that a
firm has an incentive to concentrate the advantages of its products in few dimensions
while spreading the disadvantages across as many dimensions as possible. While such
an incentive is also present in our model (yet for different reasons, as we will explain in
the next section), we derive more detailed results regarding the optimal product design.
Zhou (2007) studies a monopolist’s optimal product design if an advertising technol-
ogy is available that highlights some of the product’s characteristics. He investigates
the potential and consequences of screening if customers are differently susceptible to
such advertising. In our model, the way how customers allocate their attention is not
determined by advertising, but by the attributes of the offered products. As this de-
scribes a more specific manipulation “technology”, we are able to investigate the scope
and limitations of such a manipulation. Also working on limited attention, Spiegler
(2006a) and Spiegler (2006b) study the optimal industry behavior if consumers act
according to the S(1) sampling routine developed by Osborne and Rubinstein (1998).
Beyond the attention heuristic employed, we deem the most important difference to be
the welfare implications of limited attention. In Spiegler (2006a) and Spiegler (2006b)
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customers can be exploited by firms which obfuscate their products. Similarly, Ru-
binstein (1993) describes a firm’s incentive to use complex pricing schemes to extract
additional profits from boundedly rational customers. In contrast, we highlight that
limited attention may primarily hurt the firm while benefiting customers, despite a
firm’s ability to manipulate attention. Eliaz and Spiegler (2011) propose a model that
also features products whose sole function is to attract attention. Consumers only
consider the products of a subset of the firms in the market. Therefore, a firm uses
attention grabbers if it wants consumers to consider its products. In contrast we in-
vestigate a firm’s potential to attract or distract attention from product characteristics
(including the price), thereby manipulating the desirability of a purchase. Bordalo,
Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2010) and Bordalo (2011) develop a framework of limited at-
tention to account for choice set effects. Their idea of limited attention is inspired by
psychological findings concerning the perception of alternatives. While these papers
focus on the explanation of several experimental results, we seek to develop predictions
concerning the impact of limited attention - which in our framework refers to cognitive
restrictions, not errors in perception - on market outcomes.
There is a large literature on choice set effects (Simonson 1989; Huber, Payne, and
Puto 1982) and their impact on behavior in various settings (Herne 1997; McFadden
1999; Benartzi and Thaler 2002). Several explanations for compromise effects2 have
been proposed - ranging from extremeness aversion (Simonson and Tversky 1992) to
information inference from choice sets (Wernerfelt 1995; Kamenica 2008). Kamenica
(2008) shows that information inference creates an incentive to offer premium loss
leaders. Though not explicitly relating his model to the compromise effect Vikander
(2010) proposes a model of status effects and describes a firm’s incentives to advertise
premium products to an audience which is not able to afford the purchase. As an
example, Vikander (2010) presents some anecdotes of advertisement campaigns for
premium goods. For instance, Audi advertised its $118,000 R8 in the half-time of
Super Bowl XLII. This advertisement spot cost Audi six million dollars. What is
puzzling about this story is that only a minority of Super Bowl viewers are able to
afford such a car. So presumably if Audi wanted to advertise this car to people who
are able to buy it, there would be other far less costly marketing channels to reach
the particular target audience. We will show that in our model there is an incentive
to offer premium products which are not intended for sale. Yet in our framework this
incentive is based on a firm’s ability to manipulate its customers’ attention, and not
2The compromise effect posits that expanding the choice set by a product which is more extreme in
one attribute than any of the previously available options makes products which are mediocre in
that attribute look more favorably.
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on a firm’s attempt to signal product value (Kamenica 2008) or increase its products’
prestige value (Vikander 2010).
Johnson and Myatt (2006) describe how a firm may optimally design its product(s)
to increase or decrease the dispersion of customer valuation. They find that a firm
wants to concentrate its product’s value in a single characteristic if a firm is confined
to offer products with fixed expected value and there exists one characteristic for which
customer tastes vary strongly. Furthermore, they investigate a monopolist’s incentives
to expand or contract its product line as the taste dispersion changes. In contrast, we
discuss an incentive to expand the product line without any taste dispersion.
The remainder of this paper will proceed as follows. In Section 2 we introduce and
analyze the underlying attention process. Section 3 is dedicated to the derivation of
the optimal product design if only one product can be supplied. This will be extended
in Section 4 where firms can introduce an additional product that is designed to ma-
nipulate consumer attention. Section 5 analyzes the effects of a firm offering several of
these manipulating products. We continue by discussing some possible extensions in
Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2. The Role of Attention
This section introduces the model that we use to depict the customers’ way of deciding
between alternatives in their choice set. A main feature is that there is a difference
between experienced utility and decision utility. Experienced utility measures the sat-
isfaction or welfare that customers derive from a choice. It depends on the attributes
an alternative features and the value a customer assigns to these attributes. In con-
trast, decision utility depicts the way in which customers choose between alternatives.
Decision utility thus not only depends on the welfare a customer derives from an alter-
native, but also on the way choices are made, and thus encompasses choice procedures,
perceptions of alternatives (at the moment of choice), salience of attributes and al-
ternatives, and the like. The distinction is supposed to depict the contrast between
utility as a measure of welfare and utility as a tool to model choice (behavior).3 In our
model the salience of attributes results in a difference between experienced utility and
decision utility. The reason behind this discrepancy is the limited cognitive ability of
humans to decide optimally on the plethora of information that is available to them.
To be able to focus solely on the limited ability to process information, we do not
model any costs of obtaining information or costs of searching. Instead, we will assume
3For a distinction of the concepts of experienced utility and decision utility, see Kahneman and
Tversky (1984) and Kahneman (2000).
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that all product information is readily available, but that consumers have problems
of converting product information into an overall assessment of desirability. While we
introduce the process of attention allocation and consumer choice and the underlying
intuitions in the main text, we will prove in the Appendix that the proposed attention
allocation can itself be derived from an optimization problem.
We assume experienced utility to take the following structure, where the experienced
utility of an alternative a ∈ A is denoted by
u(a) =
n∑
i=1
vix
a
i .
The term vi ∈ R measures the (marginal) value of attribute i to the decision maker
(henceforth DM). The variable xai measures the extent to which alternative a features
attribute i. We will assume that vi 6= vi′ , ∀i 6= i′.
The consumer does not base her choice on experienced utility, but on decision utility.
Formally, the decision utility of an alternative is a function of the experienced utility
and the salience of each attribute:
u˜(a) =
n∑
i=1
mivix
a
i . (III.1)
The term mi ∈ [0, 1] is the attention parameter associated with alternative i. If mi = 0,
attribute i is completely neglected. In this case, any differences between alternatives
in attribute i will be irrelevant for the decision. We normalize the attention such that
mi ≤ 1, ∀i.4 Since attention is normalized such that mi ≤ 1, an attention allocation of
mi = 1 means that the DM pays full attention to attribute i. Note here that we would
be back in the rational model if mi = mj > 0, ∀i, j.
We now want to motivate and analyze the process that determines the attention
parameters mi. First, note that we do not model a problem of strategic attention
allocation. While an optimization problem may, to some extent, underly the way in
which attention is distributed, we assume it to be given at the moment of choice.
Instead, we assume a particular rule how the salience parameters mi are determined
and give empirical and analytical reasons why this rule is sensible. We then seek to
investigate how a firm designs its products when faced with customers who allocate
attention as described.
Note that we do not intend to model perceptional mistakes. The DM is able to
perfectly determine differences between alternatives in each dimension. The limita-
tions in the cognitive process arise when the DM needs to integrate the information
4Note that this normalization is without loss of generality since a decision utility with some attention
vector m yields the same choice behavior as a decision utility with an attention vector α ·m for
α > 0.
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about differences between alternatives in multiple dimensions with his own evaluation
concerning the importance of each dimension in order to reach an evaluation of each
alternative. This task usually includes making judgments as to how an advantage in
one dimension trades off against a disadvantage in another dimension. As the number
of relevant dimensions increases, so does the cognitive effort of evaluating all resulting
trade offs. We seek to model one way in which a decision-maker may deal with such a
complex decision problem, namely by simplification through neglect and prioritization
of aspects of the decision problem.5
We want the attention allocation to reflect a need to simplify a complex problem in
order to be able to solve it. We thus want the attention allocation to follow some basic
rules:
(a) The level of attention that a DM allocates to an attribute rises with its importance
to the DM, i.e. with the level of vi.
(b) The more the alternatives that the DM faces differ in a given attribute, i.e. the
larger the contrast within one dimension, the higher is the attention that the DM
allocates to that attribute.
(c) The cost of considering another attribute rises with the number of attributes that
are already considered.
We will now give a short overview of the assumptions and their impact on the attention
process.
Assumption (a) is present in most models of limited attention. The DM allocates
more attention to those dimensions that she deems more important. When making a
decision she tends to focus on those dimensions from which she derives most value.
Assumption (b) captures the property that the salience of a dimension increases in
the extent to which the alternatives differ in the particular attribute dimension. Hence,
the consumer’s attention is responsive to the set of available alternatives. Therefore,
attention is neither fixed nor random but depends on the context. In particular, we
will assume that attention is a function of the total dispersion in an attribute. This is
in line with models like Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2012). Also note that the general intuition
of a decision-maker neglecting small differences between options can already be found
in Rubinstein (1988). Rubinstein argues that decisions as observed in the well-known
5This might be the largest conceptual difference from other models of salience and limited attention.
In our model, the reason why the weightings mi vary across attributes is not that differences
between alternatives are perceived as being larger or smaller than they actually are. In contrast,
the weightings mi express the extent to which differences between alternatives are appreciated in
the decision process.
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Allais paradox can be explained by decision-makers treating similar probabilities or
payoffs as equal.6
Assumption (c) describes the idea that the DM finds it increasingly difficult to con-
sider an additional attribute when the complexity of the problem increases. This as-
sumption implies that there is an attention hierarchy as it matters which attributes
are considered “first”.7 Attributes that are ranked higher in the attention hierarchy
are more likely to be taken into account. In addition, we assume that this increased
complexity cost is reflected in a lower attention weight given that the attribute is in
fact considered. Thus, differences in attributes that are ranked higher are appreciated
to a greater extent. Put shortly, each attribute has a rank in the attention hierarchy
and a higher rank means that the attribute receives more attention.
In particular we assume that the ranking is strict in the sense that for two attributes
that get positive attention, the attribute that ranks higher in the attention hierarchy
is allocated strictly higher attention than the lower ranking attribute (∀mi > 0,mj >
0 : mi 6= mj). This is important because it implies that behavior is indeed distorted
by limited attention. To see this, recall from the functional form of the decision utility
(III.1) that if attention would be uniformly dampened (e.g. with mi = 0.5, ∀i), decision
utility would just be a uniform transformation of experienced utility. In this case, a
decision based on experienced utility is always the same as one based on decision utility.
For limited attention to have a behavioral effect we need at least two attributes i and
j which are allocated different levels of attention, i.e. mi 6= mj. Our assumptions make
sure that any two attributes which are considered receive a different level of attention.
To construct an attention hierarchy which satisfies both (a) and (b), let µi measure
the product of the valuation of attribute i and the maximal difference in attribute i
between any two alternatives in the choice set:
µi = vi
(
max
a∈A
xai −min
a∈A
xai
)
.
µi is the maximal difference in experienced utility a DM faces in dimension i in any
binary comparison of two alternatives in the choice set. We will assume that an at-
6Empirical results of Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) indicate that consumers indeed often tend to
pay higher attention to more dispersed attributes. They report that consumers are more sensitive
to changes in the excise tax, which is included in the posted price, than to changes in sales tax,
which is added at the register. As the posted price is larger than the additional tax that is added at
the register, the two alternatives “buying”/“not buying” differ more in the posted price dimension
than they differ in the additional tax-dimension. Thus, the more salient dimension seems to be
the more dispersed one.
7Note that the attention hierarchy is not meant to literally depict the timely sequence of how the DM
takes attributes into account. Instead the attention hierarchy depicts how important an attribute
is in the decision.
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tribute’s rank r(i) in the attention hierarchy will be determined by the measure µi. Let
r : i→ {1, ..., n} be the function that assigns an attention rank to each attribute such
that:
µi > µi′ ⇒ r(i) < r(i′),
µi = µi′ and vi > vi′ ⇒ r(i) < r(i′),
where r(i) denotes the attention rank of the attribute i.8 Having determined the
attention order we now turn to a cardinal measure of attention based on the attention
hierarchy. Let mi denote the attention paid to attribute i and define:
9
mi = max
{
0, 1− κr(i)/µi
}
.
The threshold κr(i) is the minimum level of µ which an attribute with attention rank
r needs to have in order to be taken into account. The threshold κr(i) can be thought
of as the cognitive cost of considering the r-th dimension of a problem. This cognitive
cost should reflect the fact that consumers have difficulties when having to choose
between several product that are different in many attributes. We make the following
assumptions with regard to the thresholds κr:
Assumption III.1.
(i) κ1 = 0: There is always one attribute that is fully considered.
(ii) κr < κr+1, ∀r ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}: The attention threshold is increasing with each
additional attribute that is considered.
Part (i) of the assumption ensures that there is always at least one attribute to which
the DM pays full attention. The assumption captures that we model the DM to have
difficulties with the complexity of comparing several attributes. If there is only a single
dimension, the DM should face no problems. Part (ii) captures that the difficulty of
considering an additional attribute increases with the number of attributes that are
already considered.
Assumption III.1 highlights the importance of the order of alternatives which is
depicted by r(i). First, the higher an attribute ranks in this order, the more likely it
is attended to. If an attribute ranks low in the hierarchy, it is associated with a higher
threshold κr(i), and hence it is more likely to be neglected. Attention is a function of
both value (vi) - more valued attributes are more likely to be considered - and contrast
- attributes in which alternatives differ greatly are more likely to be considered.
8Note that r(i) is well-defined since we assumed vi 6= vj , ∀i 6= j.
9To let mi always be well-defined let mi = 0 if µi = 0 and κr(i) > 0, and let mi = 1 if µi = 0 and
κr(i) = 0.
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2.1. Comparison to Other Models of Limited Attention
The proposed model of attention allocation is conceptually very close to the one of
Gabaix (2011). It takes over the idea of sparsity, meaning that some attributes are
neglected by the DM if they are not “important enough”. A major difference to the
attention process of Gabaix is that the threshold κr(i) associated with an attribute i
depends on an attribute’s relative importance, i.e. on how large its value and dispersion
are compared to other attributes’ values and dispersions. While we retain the assump-
tion that the vector of thresholds (κ1, ..., κn) is exogenous, we impose a structure that
we deem appropriate to reflect the notion of complexity costs. First, the decision-
making process should not be distorted if the problem is not complex. We ensure
this property by assuming κ1 = 0. Second, we argue that an increase in complexity
should be reflected by an increased difficulty to consider more and more dimensions of
a problem. This motivates our assumption of increasing thresholds κr(i).
A second difference is the distinction between the salience, captured by mi, and the
value of an attribute, vi. This distinction might seem superfluous at first glance as
neither can be observed in isolation. Yet this simple distinction spares us the need
to normalize our parameters to make salience independent of scaling. We find this
feature desirable as we are concerned that some of the behavioral implications which
Gabaix derives are based on this rescaling. In that sense certain behavior is predicted
to occur not because people are inattentive but because this inattention is argued to
be scale-independent.
The model we use also shares a central property with the model of focus-dependent
utility of Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2012). They posit that the weighting of an attribute
(mi) is a strictly increasing function of the maximal utility difference associated with
that attribute (µi). Our model shares this feature conditional on an attribute being
considered, but not fully considered (0 < mi < 1). However a major difference is
that our model also allows attributes to be fully neglected. Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2012)
apply their model to a monopolist’s problem to design a single product. They find
an incentive to concentrate value of a product in one attribute and an incentive to
split the price (and thus the disadvantage of a purchase) into multiple items. We are
concerned that the first result is not an effect of the assumed focus-weighting alone but
also depends strongly on the assumed cost function. In contrast, in our model there
is an incentive to concentrate value that is entirely due to the weighting of attributes,
i.e. in our context due to inattention. The reason is that if customers tend to neglect
attributes of little importance, firms have an incentive to concentrate on few attributes
in which they excel. The incentive to split the price into several items is also present
in our model and is further strengthened by the consumers’ tendency to neglect.
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Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2010) present a model of salience-based choice. In
contrast to our model, the modeling of salience is inspired by observations on perception
(and not cognition) and assumes choice to be the result of multiple binary comparisons.
More technically, the weighting does not only depend on the available choice set but
also on the current binary comparison. Thus, an attribute’s salience in an alternative
may be quite different depending on which two alternatives are currently examined.
Closer to our understanding of attention is the model of rational inattention of Sims
(2003). Like him, we do not seek to model costly information acquisition or informa-
tion production (if one wants to understand perceptional biases in this way), but the
problems associated with processing available information. Yet, while he focuses on
the limits of data processing-capability, we seek to model the cognitive costs associated
with solving a complex optimization problem.10
3. Optimal Product Design of a Monopolist
In this section we investigate the problem of a monopolist who wants to design a
single product that is intended to be sold to customers with the described attention
process. What is central to our analysis is that attention is a function of the choices
that are available. This implies that a firm is able to manipulate attention since it
can influence the choice set that a consumer faces. We will begin our analysis by
restricting the monopolist to a product with a single quality. We proceed by asking
whether the monopolist would like to improve this product by introducing additional
qualities. Thereby we derive the optimal design of the product. We then discuss under
what conditions and in which way a firm may profit from introducing further products,
and how the optimal product line is designed.
Suppose there are n qualities (save the price) that a product can have. Together with
the price a product thus features n+ 1 attributes.11 For now suppose that the level of
each quality can take any non-negative real value: xi ∈ R+, ∀i = 1, ..., n. There is one
attribute xp which denotes the wealth of the decision maker. W.l.o.g. we normalize
initial wealth to zero such that a value xap ≤ 0 means that alternative a is associated
10As an illustration of Sims’ idea, think of a savings problem to which the optimal rule is to consume
half the income: ct = 0.5yt. Suppose income is a random variable and takes on the value 10.458376
at some t. In Sims’ model the adaptation of ct to the optimal value (5.229188) is costly as is requires
the processing of the 8-digit input yt. Note however that in Sims (2003), finding the optimal rule
itself is not subject to cognition cost (though the anticipation of processing cost may alter the
optimal solution itself). In contrast, we focus on the impact of limited attention on the derivation
of the optimal solution.
11Note here that we differentiate between the n qualities and the n + 1 attributes, which are all
qualities and the price.
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with a price of P = −xap. Before we turn to the optimal design problem define a null
good as an alternative with x0i = 0, ∀i = 1, ..., n.
A monopolist seeks to design a product that maximizes profits subject to the cus-
tomer’s willingness to buy it. To ensure that the customer is willing to purchase the
good, the decision utility of the good (alternative a) must be weakly higher than the
decision utility of abstaining from the purchase (alternative b). Note that alternative b
is equivalent to a null good that is free of charge. Therefore, not buying is associated
with a decision utility (and experienced utility) of zero. Part (i) of Assumption III.1
then implies that the monopolist cannot extract a positive profit by selling a null good
at a positive price. Thus the product the monopolist designs must actually feature
some positive qualities.
Let the costs of producing quality level xi be c(xi) =
1
2
cix
2
i . The monopolist then
maximizes his profit subject to the decision utility of alternative a being non-negative:
max
P, xi
P − 1
2
n∑
i=1
cix
2
i ,
subject to u˜(a) ≥ 0.
First, let us look at the case in which a monopolist employs a single quality to equip his
product with. In this case, the set of feasible prices is constrained by the fact that the
price must rank second in the attention hierarchy: vixi ≥ vpP ⇒ r(i) = 1, r(p) = 2.
Otherwise the decision utility from buying the product would be strictly negative. This
yields a maximum price P ∗ = vixi/vp.12 Then it follows that the profit maximizing
choice of the quality level xi is:
x∗i =
vi
vpci
, (III.2)
while the resulting profit is
Π∗ =
v2i
2ci(vp)2
. (III.3)
Now let us define the profitability measure pii:
pii ≡ v
2
i
2ci(vp)2
, ∀i = 1, ..., n.
The value pii is the profit that a monopolist can extract from producing a product
that features only quality i. We will refer to it as the profitability of quality i as
it also denotes the maximum additional profit a monopolist could make by adding
12We assume here that vi > vp, so the tie due to µi = µp is broken in favor of the quality dimension.
If this is not the case the price is set marginally below vi/(vpci).
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this quality to his product under full attention. It is straightforward to see that a
monopolist who is confined to produce only a single-quality product will choose the
quality with the largest pii. It is interesting to compare this result to the one under
full attention (full attention is equal to the case κr(i) = 0, ∀r(i)). First, note that if
only one quality is produced, price, product design, and profit are equal to the solution
under full attention. The sole difference is that under limited attention the decision
utility of purchasing the product is strictly positive. While the price extracts all the
value created by the quality, it is not perceived to do so (because it is not fully taken
into account). Still it is not possible for the monopolist to exploit this and increase
the price further. If the price was increased slightly above the derived price P ∗, the
decision value created by the quality would drop due to a reallocation of attention from
quality to price, thereby yielding negative decision utility and preventing the purchase
altogether.
Now suppose the monopolist contemplates to introduce a second quality. This is only
profitable if it allows to increase the price sufficiently to cover the cost of producing
an additional quality. Yet, recall that the optimal price of the optimal single-quality
product was already at the threshold of receiving attention rank 1, vpP
∗ = vix∗i . It
follows that any price increase beyond the price of the single-quality product moves the
price dimension to the top of the attention hierarchy. In other words, if the optimal
product has at least two qualities, its price will rank first in the attention hierarchy.
This shift in the attention rank lowers the decision utility derived from the first quality
that the product already features and thus also lowers the profit that the monopolist
can extract from the first quality.
As before, the maximal price the monopolist can charge is given by the non-negativity
constraint on the decision value of the product. Thus the monopolist will charge a price
P ∗ =
1
vp
(mivixi +mjvjxj) .
The optimal levels of the two qualities then are:
xi =

vi
vpci
if mi(xi = vi/(vpci)) > 0,
0 otherwise,
xj =

vj
vpcj
if mj(xj = vj/(vpci)) > 0,
0 otherwise.
It is straightforward that the introduction of an additional quality is only profitable if
both qualities receive positive attention. But even if this is the case, the resulting profit
may fall below the maximal profit of a product with a single quality. This is not because
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the new quality distracts attention from the quality the product was already equipped
with. This may be the case but it does not change profit. Instead, the potential
decrease in profits results from the fact that the price increase necessary to make the
introduction of a new quality worthwhile distracts attention from the qualities and
attracts attention to the price. Formally, the profit of the product with two qualities
(if both of them are considered) is given by:
Π∗ = pii + pij − κ2/vp − κ3/vp. (III.4)
Thus, it is more profitable to sell a two-quality product if and only if:
pij ≥ 1
vp
(κ2 + κ3).
The introduction of an additional quality is only worthwhile if the revenue that can be
extracted from the second quality is sufficient to cover the physical costs of providing
this second quality, the cognitive costs of considering this second quality, and the
decrease in profits that is caused by the downgrade in the attention rank of the first
quality.
Note that from the profit expression (III.4) it becomes clear that the firm is not
benefiting from limited consumer attention. If consumers were fully attentive, the
firm could make a profit of Π = pii + pij. The fact that the firms makes lower profits
if consumers have limited attention stems from consumers not fully appreciating the
qualities of the product. Therefore, consumers with limited attention have a lower
willingness-to-pay than fully attentive consumers have.
In the following we try to exemplify our results with short numerical examples. These
examples seek to illustrate the mechanisms that drive our results. Let us first consider
an example to illustrate the obstacles of introducing a second quality.
Example III.1. Suppose there are two possible qualities with value parameters v1 = 10
and v2 = 9. We normalize the value of money to vp = 1. Initially, assume there are
no cost differences between the two characteristics, c1 = c2 = 3. Finally, assume the
cognition costs are κr(i) = 2
r(i)−1 − 1, yielding κ1 = 0, κ2 = 1, and κ3 = 3.
In this setting it is optimal for the monopolist to equip his product with qualities at
the level x∗1 = 3.33 and x
∗
2 = 3, such that m1 = 0.97 and m2 = 0.89. This yields an
optimal price of p = 56.33 and a profit of Π = 26.17. If the monopolist would offer a
product with only one attribute, profits would be Π = 16.67 when using quality 1 and
Π = 13.5 when using quality 2. Hence, the monopolist will offer a product with both
qualities.
Now suppose that the second quality is more costly to produce with c2 = 15, all else
equal. If the monopolist produces both qualities, the profit is Π = 15.37 which is less
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than the profit from equipping the product with only quality 1. Note that this is not
the result of the customer not attending to quality 2. If a good with both attributes is
produced, the optimal level of quality 2 would be x∗2 = 0.6 which yields positive attention
factor m2 = 0.44 > 0. However, the profitability of the second quality pi2 = 2.7 is not
sufficient to cover the decrease in willingness-to-pay that is induced by the cognitive costs
of attending the second quality κ3 = 3 and the increase in cognitive costs associated
with quality 1. Thus for a low profitability of attribute 2 it is optimal to equip the
product with only attribute 1.
Similar considerations apply if the product can be equipped with more than two
qualities. As we have argued before, the price associated with a multi-quality product
must be ranking first in the attention hierarchy. Yet, this also means that the price
increase associated with adding a third quality to a two-quality product does not result
in the price receiving more attention. As soon as the price receives full attention, i.e.
as soon as the product features at least two qualities, price increases are no longer
associated with an increased salience of the price dimension. Hence, when considering
adding a third quality to the product, the necessary price increase will no longer be
associated with a rise in attention allocated to the price. Thus, additional qualities
will be introduced (naturally in the order of their profitability) if their profitability is
sufficient to cover the cognitive costs of their consideration.
Denote by pi(t) the t-th most profitable attribute (ties may be broken according to
vi). Then we find the following result.
Proposition III.1.
If a monopolist intends to supply a single good to the market, the optimal design will
feature:
(i) only the most profitable quality (i : pii = pi
(1)) if and only if @ m ∈ {2, ..., n} :∑m
t=2
(
pi(t) − 1
vp
κt+1
)
≥ 1
vp
κ2.
(ii) Otherwise, it will feature the m most profitable qualities for which
∑m
t=1
(
pi(t) − 1
vp
κt+1
)
≥
0, while pi(m+1) − 1
vp
κm+2 < 0.
All qualities i ∈ I that the product features are produced at a level xi = vi/(vpci).
If the optimal good features only one quality, the price extracts the whole valuation
of the consumer, with P = (vixi)/vp. In this case, the price ranks second in salience
and is thus not receiving full attention (mp < 1). The decision utility of purchasing the
product is strictly positive, i.e. u˜(a) > 0. If the optimal good features several qualities,
the price ranks first in salience (mp = 1) and extracts the total decision value of the
qualities, i.e. u˜(a) = 0. Yet it does not extract the entire value of the product in terms
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of experienced utility:
P =
1
vp
∑
i∈I
mivixi <
1
vp
∑
i∈I
vixi,
with I being the set of qualities that the product features.
Intuitively, one can understand Proposition III.1 as showing how the limited atten-
tion of the customers translates into an augmented cost function of the monopolist. The
limited attention reduces the willingness-to-pay for complex products, i.e. for products
featuring more than one quality. This is equivalent to a monopolist facing additional
costs when offering complex products. These costs include variable costs κt+1/vp asso-
ciated with introducing the t-th quality (t > 1), as well as fixed costs κ2/vp associated
with offering a complex product in the first place.
A couple of things are noteworthy. Given the product features a particular quality,
its optimal level is the same as the one under full attention. This is due to two effects
resulting from limited attention. First, limited attention reduces a firm’s incentives to
invest in quality as the created value is not fully taken into account by the customer.
Second, the endogeneity of attention increases a firm’s incentives to invest in quality as
any additional unit of quality increases the attention paid to that attribute and thus
the decision value of any unit of quality already invested.13 In our model, these two
effects cancel out each other perfectly as the maximization problem of the monopolist
yields the same level of product quality as in the case with unlimited attention for those
qualities which are considered. However, the product generally features less qualities
than under full attention and the price is lower if the product features more than a single
quality. Note here that the exact canceling of the above-mentioned effects hinges on our
modeling of limited attention, in particular our use of the range (maxa∈A xai−mina∈A xai )
as a measure of attribute dispersion. Yet, we claim that the second effect prevails as
long as one retains the assumption of a higher attribute dispersion attracting attention.
As this second effect compensates the first, limited attention does not necessarily imply
the production of lower quality levels.
To motivate our next section recall the profit (III.4) that the firm makes when it offers
a product that features more than one quality. It holds that, as soon as the product
features more than one quality, the monopolist cannot extract the whole experienced
utility that the product yields to the customer. This is because consumers decide on the
basis of decision utility. In the case of multiple qualities the price receives full attention
while all qualities receive less than full attention. Yet, the attention that is allocated
13Note that the firm’s incentive to invest in quality in order to increase attention is conditional on
the attribute being considered. If the attribute is not considered, small changes in quality might
be insufficient in order to lift attention to a positive level.
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to the qualities depends on the available choice set. That is what motivates the next
section. We will analyze a way in which the monopolist can increase the customer’s
attention and thus the decision value of the product that is sold to consumers without
changing the product itself.
4. Optimal Product Design with Introduction of a Bait
Good
Recall that the consumer attention is a function of both the valuation vi and the
dispersion within the choice set (maxxi−minxi). A firm might not be able to change
the valuation vi of an attribute, but it can manipulate the dispersion. If the firm
can produce several goods, it might have an incentive to produce goods that have the
sole purpose of increasing the dispersion of attributes, thereby making these attributes
more salient. Note that the quality levels are bounded below by the option of not
buying (minxi = 0). This implies that in order to increase dispersion, products that
are designed to manipulate attention must feature high quality levels. Such products
will increase dispersion by increasing maxxi. Yet, if these products are not intended
for sale, they must be unattractive to consumers. This could, for example, be achieved
by a very high price. In the following, we will use the term bait good for those goods
that have the sole purpose of manipulating consumer attention. Because these bait
goods are designed to be unattractive, consumers still buy the main good which we
will henceforth call primary good.14 We will now analyze how a bait good is optimally
designed.
In the analysis we will assume that the firm does not incur any costs for designing
and producing the bait good. This is obviously not realistic in most circumstances.
We maintain this assumption to concentrate on the question whether it is possible to
increase the willingness-to-pay of consumers for the primary good, and thus the profit
made from its sale.
In addition, there exist further arguments why the cost of the bait good might be
negligible. First, if the bait good is never actually sold to the customer, it only needs
a single item of the bait good that can be (unsuccessfully) offered to each of a large
number of customers. If, as we will show, the bait good increases profits, the additional
profits reaped from each customer may in sum be sufficient to cover the cost of bait
good production. A second avenue to accommodate the cost of producing the bait
good is to allow for customer heterogeneity in their intrinsic valuation of money. As we
14Obviously, the primary good still has to yield positive decision utility to the consumer in order to
be bought.
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will argue in the discussion section, a product designed for a richer customer segment
is a prime candidate to serve as a bait good for a poorer customer segment. In this
way, the bait good is produced both for sale (to a rich customer segment) as well as
for the manipulation of attention (of a poorer customer segment).
As outlined before, bait goods will be designed to have premium quality. In reality,
maximum quality levels are of course bounded at some level. For example, there are
technological and physical limitations on the horsepower that a car can have. Therefore,
we will now assume technical frontiers for each quality. Formally, all xi ∈ [0, x¯i] with
x¯i ∈ R+.
Now let us look at the introduction of a bait good that is designed to attract attention
to the qualities of the primary good, but without changing the attention hierarchy of the
qualities embodied in the primary good. Note first that if the monopolist is confined
to producing a good with only a single quality, there is nothing to be gained from
manipulating attention. This is because the primary good is designed such that the
single quality employed ranks first in the attention hierarchy and thus receives full
attention. This is different if the primary good features several qualities where, as
we have shown before, the price gets full attention while the qualities do not get full
attention. A bait good will then derive its value through increasing the attention paid
to the qualities, which were not fully considered or neglected altogether. In this case,
the following result applies:
Proposition III.2. Suppose a monopolist’s profit-maximizing product design features
at least two qualities: |I| ≥ 2. If at least one of these qualities is not produced at the
highest feasible level, the monopolist can strictly increase profits by using a bait good.
Proof. Consider a monopolist whose product features |I| ≥ 2 qualities. Further sup-
pose that the optimal level of one of these qualities is below its technological frontier,
i.e. ∃j ∈ I : x∗j = vjvpcj < x¯j. Let the monopolist offer a second product, called bait
good, which has the same level of qualities as the initial product, i.e. xbi = xi, ∀i. The
price of the bait good is set sufficiently high such that it is unattractive to consumers.
This introduction of the bait good has no impact on the attention levels with mp = 1
and mi = 1 − κr(i)/(vixbi), ∀i. However, the profit from the sale of the primary good
now has the following form:
Π∗ = P ∗ −
∑
i
c(xi) =
∑
i∈I
[
1
vp
mivixi − 1
2
cix
2
i
]
,
with
mi =
max
{
0, 1− κr(i)/(vixbi)
}
for xi ≤ xbi ,
max
{
0, 1− κr(i)/(vixi)
}
for xi > x
b
i .
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Then it holds that the new optimal level for quality j of the primary good is:
x∗j =
1
vpcj
(
vj − κr(j) 1
xbj
)
<
vj
vpcj
.
Since the original level of the quality was still feasible (xj =
vj
vpcj
) and the attention
allocation under the new design is the same as under the old design, it must hold by
revealed preference that the firm makes higher profits with the introduction of the bait
good.
The bait good thus increases the profit that can be made from the sale of the primary
good while keeping the attention hierarchy among attributes intact. Note here that we
have just shown that a bait good can increase profits under fairly simple conditions.
We have not yet looked at the profit maximizing design of the bait good.One obvious
venue to further increase profits is by increasing the qualities of the bait good which in
turn increases attention for these qualities. This procedure is outlined in the following
example.
Example III.2. First, let us consider the case where v1 = 10, v2 = 9, vp = 1,
κ1 = 0, κ2 = 1, κ3 = 3, and c1 = c2 = 3 as in Example III.1. In addition, let
us assume technological frontiers of x¯1 = x¯2 = 6. If the monopolist designs a bait
good with qualities xb1 = x¯1, x
b
2 = x¯2 and a prohibitively high price, the customers
attention for both qualities of the primary good will increase. The high price ensures
that the consumer is not being tempted to buy the bait good itself. Given this bait good,
the monopolist’s optimal design of the primary good features both qualities at levels
x∗1 = 3.28 and x
∗
2 = 2.83, such that m1 = 0.98 and m2 = 0.94. This yields a profit of
Π = 28.16 that exceeds the maximal profit of Π = 26.17 that the firm made without the
bait good.
Also note that Proposition III.2 is only a sufficient condition for the profitability of
the bait good. For example, suppose that without usage of a bait good, it was optimal
to produce a primary product with only one quality. Then the introduction of the bait
good may allow the firm to profitably introduce further qualities.
Example III.3. Let us reconsider the second case in Example III.1 in which the higher
costs of the second quality c2 = 15 made its introduction unprofitable. Using the same
bait good as above in Example III.2, the monopolist can make a profit of Π = 18.52
by equipping the primary good with both qualities. This exceeds the profit that the firm
can make by offering a primary good with only a single quality. The use of a bait good
can thus make the introduction of qualities profitable which were unprofitable without
the bait good.
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In addition to merely increasing the attention paid to each attribute of the primary
good, a bait good can be employed to shift the attention order, e.g. to push a more
profitable characteristic to a more salient position. We will now investigate under what
conditions this is profitable. Suppose for simplicity that the primary good features two
qualities i = 1, 2 and assume that m1 > m2. Further assume that the bait good in
this setup features qualities xb1 = x¯1 and x
b
2 = v1x¯1/v2 < x¯2. Thus the bait good is
designed in such a way that the primary good yields maximal profit given that the
first quality ranks higher in the attention order than the second quality. Increasing xb2
above v1x¯1/v2 would change the attention order: the first quality would become less,
the second quality more salient. Recall that, with the introduction of the bait good,
the profit of the firm takes the form:
Π∗ =
∑
i∈I
piim
2
i .
Then it is easy to see that the change in the attention order is profitable if the additional
profit made from quality 2 exceeds the reduction in profits from quality 1:
pi2
(
m22,new −m22,old
)
> pi1
(
m21,old −m21,new
)
.
This equation is likely to hold if (a) quality 2 is more profitable than quality 1, and/or
(b) the technology frontier x¯2 of quality 2 greatly exceeds the restriction v1x¯1/v2 that
the bait good would have to satisfy in order to retain the old attention order.
Let us consider an example that highlights that it may be optimal to produce a
bait good that changes the ordering of the attention hierarchy. The example also
illustrates that it may be optimal to produce a bait good with some qualities below
their technological boundaries.
Example III.4 (Profitability). Suppose customer valuations are v1 = 10, v2 = 9, and
vp = 1 as before, but costs are c1 = 6 and c2 = 3. The profitability values are pi1 = 8.33
and pi2 = 13.5 and hence quality 1 is less profitable than quality 2. Suppose the bait good
was constructed as in Examples III.2 and III.3 by setting xb1 = x¯1 = 6 and x
b
2 = x¯2 = 6.
Then the less profitable quality would rank higher (at rank 2, behind the price) than
the more profitable quality (rank 3). This yields a profit of Π = 20.10. From the profit
formula for the case with bait goods Π =
∑
i∈I piim
2
i it follows that a monopolist may
profit from manipulating the attention hierarchy such that the most profitable quality
gets the most attention. Suppose xb1 was lowered to 5. This would make quality 2 rank
second in the attention order, and quality 1 rank third, yielding a profit of pi = 20.36.15
15Actually, it would be sufficient (and thus optimal) to lower xb1 slightly below (v2x¯2)/v1 = 5.4. If,
e.g., xb1 = 5.3 was chosen, profit would be Π = 20.42.
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This example illustrates that the bait good cannot only be used to attract attention,
but also to distract attention. This is attractive if a firm wants to distract customers’
attention from a more valuable, but less profitable quality to a less valuable, but more
profitable quality.
Example III.4 highlights that firms usually have an incentive to make the most
profitable qualities most salient. However, this is not always the case. We will now
give an example in which the firm prefers to rank a high-technology attribute higher
than a high-profitability attribute. Consider the following example.
Example III.5 (Technology differences). Assume v1 = 10, v2 = 9, vp = 1, and
c1 = c2 = 3 as in Example III.1. However, assume that x¯1 = 6 and x¯2 = 60. As
in Example III.1, quality 1 is more valuable to the customer and more profitable to
the firm than quality 2. It is optimal to set xb1 = x¯1 = 6 irrespective of the attention
rank that quality 1 is assigned in the end. Suppose it is assigned rank 2 (the price
has rank 1) while quality 2 is assigned rank 3. Then xb2 is restricted to the value
v1x¯1/v2 = 10 · 6/9 = 6.67, because otherwise quality 2 ranks higher than quality 1.
The resulting maximal profit for the firm is Π = 28.30. If, however, the firm sets
xb1 = x¯1 = 6 and x
b
2 = x¯2 = 60, the less profitable quality 2 will rank second in
the attention hierarchy, while the more profitable quality 1 ranks third. This yields a
profit of Π = 28.49 which is an improvement. In this example, for all values of x¯2
above approximately 12.5 it is optimal for the firm to make the higher-valued and more
profitable quality less salient. It therefore illustrates that a firm may sometimes have
an incentive to use a bait good to distract from a more profitable quality. This should,
however, only occur in situations in which there are small differences in profitability
but huge differences in the technological limitations associated with the two qualities.
As shown in the various examples, the bait good is effective in attracting attention
when it features qualities at a high level. However, when contemplating the optimal
attention manipulation, the firm faces the following trade-off: On the one hand, the
firm has an incentive to let profitable qualities rank high in the attention order (see
Example III.4). This allows to attract a lot of attention to these characteristics, which
enables the firm to extract more of the surplus created in this dimension. Yet, assigning
a particular rank to a quality imposes a restriction. In order for a quality to keep its
assigned rank, the extent of attention that can be attracted to all qualities at lower
ranks is limited. This may conflict with the incentive to attract as much attention as
possible to all, specifically lower-ranking, qualities by exploiting technological frontiers.
Until now we have assumed that the firm can produce only one bait good. In the next
section we will investigate under which circumstances it might be optimal to employ
several bait goods.
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5. Usage of Several Bait Goods
As derived above, the purpose of the bait good is to increase attention for the qualities
that are featured by the primary good. This increase in attention allows the firm to
charge higher prices since it leads to an increase in the consumer’s willingness-to-pay.
In particular, the bait good increases attention of some attributes if it is equipped with
extremely high levels of these quality. However, since the firm does not actually want
to sell the bait good, it has to charge a very high price for it in order to make it less
attractive to consumers than the primary good. Recall that this implied that the price
kept the highest rank in the attention hierarchy. Since the price already ranked first
under the optimal design of a single product (if |I| ≥ 2), thus being fully considered
with mp = 1, the high bait good price had no influence on the salience of the price
dimension.
When the firm is allowed to produce more than one bait good, it can use a different
approach towards attention manipulation. Suppose the firm initially produces a pri-
mary good that features several qualities. One potential bait good that the firm could
introduce is one that features a high level of the first quality and no additional qualities.
This would increase the attention that consumers pay to the first quality. Since the
new bait good only features one quality (and the primary good features many), the bait
good’s price does not need to be very high in order to make its purchase unattractive.
Then the firm could produce several bait goods that each feature one premium quality.
As we will show, the usage of several specialized bait goods can make it feasible to make
some qualities even more salient than the price. This might be profitable because if
the price is less salient, the willingness-to-pay of consumers increases which allows the
firm to raise the price of the primary good. Hence, as we will show below, the usage of
several bait goods can be even more profitable than the usage of a single high-priced
bait good.
Now we want to determine how a specialized bait good can be used to make a quality
more salient than the price. In the following, we assume w.l.o.g. vi > vi+1, ∀i =
1, ..., n − 1. Consider the case in which the firm wants to make the most valuable
quality 1 more salient than the price.16 When employing a specialized bait good, the
firm has to meet several restrictions for the design of the bait good. First, it must still
hold that the bait good is less attractive than the primary good:
u˜primary ≥ u˜bait1 . (III.5)
16It is not per se clear which quality should be pushed to the first attention rank. Hence, the following
derivations concerning quality 1 simply serve as an example on how a specialized bait good can be
used.
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In addition, the bait good should not increase the salience of the price, i.e. pbait1 ≤
pprimary. Since the bait good should be unattractive, we can focus on the case p ≡
pbait1 = p
primary. For a bait good with quality 1 we can then write (III.5) as:
n∑
i=1
mivix
primary
i −mpvpp ≥ m1v1xbait1 −mpvpp
⇔
n∑
i=1
mivix
primary
i ≥ m1v1xbait1 . (III.6)
Since the objective is to push the price to a lower attention rank, the bait good must
be designed such that quality 1 ranks higher than the price. So if a bait good features
only quality 1, the bait good must suffice
v1x
bait
1 ≥ vpp. (III.7)
Combining (III.6) and (III.7), it must hold that:
n∑
i=1
mivix
primary
i ≥ m1v1xbait1 ≥ m1vpp. (III.8)
Note here that the price was initially at the highest attention rank. Hence, if quality
1 gets pushed in front of the price, it is now ranking first with m1 = 1. Then, (III.8)
can be written as:
n∑
i=1
mivix
primary
i ≥ v1xbait1 ≥ vpp. (III.9)
By setting xbait1 and p such that all three terms in (III.9) have equal value, the firm can
charge a maximum price of:
p =
1
vp
n∑
i=1
mivix
primary
i .
This expression looks like the pricing formula in the case with only a single bait good.
Note, however, that m1 has increased relative to the case with only one bait good
(because quality 1 has gained one rank in the attention hierarchy). Hence, by employing
a specialized bait good the firm raised the price it can charge for the primary good.
Until now we have described how attribute 1 can be pushed in front of the price in
the ranking of salience. We can proceed by doing the same with qualities 2, 3, and
so on. If quality 2 shall gain attention rank 2, the bait good for quality 2 must be
designed such that it satisfies:
v1x
bait
1 ≥ v2xbait2 ≥ vpp. (III.10)
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If this condition can be fulfilled, the second bait good increases m2 because quality 2
would gain one rank in the attention hierarchy.
In principle, this process can be continued for all other qualities. For all qualities
that are more salient than the price it must hold that vix
bait
i = vi+1x
bait
i+1. Note here
that since vi > vi+1, each additional bait good must be produced to have a higher level
of the quality on which it is specialized, i.e. xbaiti < x
bait
i+1. This may not be feasible for
all qualities due to the technological bounds x¯i. Hence, it may not be possible to make
all qualities more salient than the price. However, even for qualities that rank below
the price attention can be increased by using bait goods. Just as before, qualities that
rank below the price can still be made more salient relative to the no-bait-good-case
by producing a bait good that has a quality level for the given attributes that is above
the quality level of the primary good. This effect is basically the same as in the case
with only one bait good.
Example III.6 (Several bait goods). Suppose that we have v1 = 10, v2 = 9, vp = 1,
c1 = 3, and c2 = 3. In addition, we assume that x¯1 = x¯2 = 6. We have seen before that,
without the usage of a bait good, the firm would make a profit of Π = 26.17. By using
a single bait good that featured both qualities, the firm was able to increase its profit
to Π = 28.16. The firm achieved this increase in profit by producing a bait good with
xbait1 = x¯1 = 6 and x
bait
2 = x¯2 = 6. This leads to an increase in attention factors m1
and m2, relative to the case without a bait good, and thereby increases the consumers’
willingness-to-pay. However, since the bait good was not intended for sale, the firm had
to set a high bait good price which implied that the price remained in attention rank 1.
If the firm can produce two bait goods, it turns out that it is easier to make them
unattractive. The reason is that the primary good features two qualities and each bait
good features only one quality. Let us consider the optimal bait good design. The firm
wants to achieve that (some) qualities are more salient than the price dimension. This
can be achieved by producing a bait good that features a high level of its particular
quality. However, since the price is dependent on the resulting attention structure, we
have to solve this problem recursively. This is necessary because the bait good design is
dependent on the price, but the price is also dependent on the bait good design.
Solving this problem, we find that the optimal qualities of the primary good are
xprimary1 = 3.33 and x
primary
2 = 2.83 while the price is p = 57.42. The bait good that
features quality 1 is produced with xbait1 = 5.74 and p
bait = p = 57.42. This ensures
that v1x
bait
1 ≥ vpp and hence quality 1 is more salient than the price. In principle, the
firm would also like to make quality 2 more salient than the price. However, this would
require v2x
bait
2 ≥ vpp, yielding xbait2 ≥ 6.38, which is not feasible due to x¯2 = 6. Thus
the firm is confined to offer a second specialized bait good at the highest technological
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level with xbait2 = 6. Hence, quality 1 will rank first in the attention hierarchy, followed
by the price and quality 2. This yields attention parameters m1 = 1, mp = 0.98, and
m2 = 0.94. The resulting profit of the firm is Π = 28.71, which is higher than in the
case with only a single bait good.
This example illustrates several effects that occur when using several bait goods. Note
that the quality of the first bait good is restricted to xbait1 = 5.47 in order to not be more
attractive than the primary good. A similar restriction would be in place for all qualities
that are intended to be made more salient than the price. For example, quality 2 would
have to be no higher than xbait2 = 6.66.
17
Note that for all qualities that do not rank first in the attention hierarchy these
restrictions limit the attention that can be drawn to these qualities. Suppose that the
technological limits are very high (say x¯i = 50). Then the firm could design two bait
goods such that qualities 1 and 2 are more salient than the price. This however would
mean that the attention drawn to quality 2 is limited by equation (III.10). It will turn
out that even if it is feasible to make a quality more salient than the price, it might not
always be optimal to do so. In the case with x¯i = 50 it is more profitable to employ
a single bait good and exploit the technological boundaries. Although this implies that
qualities 1 and 2 receive a lower rank (2 instead of 1 and 3 instead of 2), the increase
in attention for quality 2 will offset the decrease in attention for quality 1.
To see this consider the outlined example with x¯i = 50. In this case, the bait good
levels that would be chosen in order to make attributes 1 and 2 more salient than
the price would be xbait1 = 6 and x
bait
2 = 6.66. This would yield attention parameters
m1 = 1, m2 = 0.98, mp = 0.95, and a profit of Π = 29.72. If, however, the firm would
use a single bait good with maximum quality levels xbait1 = x
bait
2 = 50, the attention
parameters would be mp = 1, m1 = 0.998, and m2 = 0.99. In this case, the profit of
the firm would be Π = 29.92, which is an improvement.
We conclude that the usage of several specialized bait goods is only profitable if the
technological limits on quality levels are neither too low (making qualities more salient
than the price allows only very small prices) nor too high (usage of a single bait good
that exploits the technological limits is more profitable than trying to distract attention
from the price through specialized bait goods).
17The beforementioned value xbait2 = 6.38 is sufficient to increase the attention rank of quality 2.
However, due to the increased attention, it is then optimal to increase the quality 2 of the primary
good a bit. This increases the attractiveness of the primary good such that xbait2 can be further
increased. Solving this recursively, the maximum quality that the second bait good can have in
order to still be less attractive than the primary good is xbait2 = 6.66.
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6. Discussion
This paper seeks to highlight how a firm may employ certain products to manipulate
the attention allocation of its customers. There are a couple of issues and potential
extensions of the model that are worth further discussion.
6.1. Heterogeneous Consumers
Until now we have assumed that consumers are homogeneous in both their preferences
and their cognitive abilities. This assumption could be weakened in several ways.
One interesting possibility is to allow customers to have different levels of wealth. For
simplicity assume there are two groups of customers, very loosely labeled some are poor
and some are rich. Let the first group assign higher importance to the money dimension
(and thus the price) of a product: vpoorp > v
rich
p . This will result in a firm designing
different products to cater to both groups of customers. Recalling Proposition III.1, the
rich group’s ideal product may feature more qualities than the poor group’s product.
More interestingly, it features all the qualities the poor group’s product has on a higher
level. This makes the rich group’s product an ideal candidate to be a bait good for
the poor group. It increases the attention paid to all the qualities that the product for
the poor features and thereby increases the willingness-to-pay of the poor. In this way,
a firm may employ products designed for richer customer segments as a bait good for
poorer customer segments. This might explain one of the examples we discussed in the
introduction: the advertisement of expensive cars to an audience of which a majority
is not able to afford it.
If customers differ in the cognitive constraints they face, i.e. if they differ in their
cognition costs κi, a firm may cater to these different groups with products differing in
their degree of complexity. One reason for different cognitive constraints could be that
one group has to act under stronger time pressure. If this is the case, the firm could,
for example, offer products that differ in the number of qualities they feature. The
hurried customer segment is then offered a product with only a few essential features,
while customers with more time prefer more elaborate products.
Finally, customers may differ in their valuation for different qualities. As these valua-
tions influence both a quality’s profitability and the relative ease of attention attraction,
a firm may have strong incentives to segment the customer population and design an
appropriate product line for each segment separately. Still, analogous to the discussion
of differing wealth levels, a firm may have an incentive to offer a product designed
for one customer segment to a different segment despite that segment’s unwillingness
to purchase the product. Offering a sports car to a family father may increase his
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willingness-to-pay for horse power despite his general focus on car safety.
6.2. Negative “Qualities”
So far we have assumed that all qualities (save the price) are valued by the customer
(vi ≥ 0, ∀i). There are certainly some characteristics that a product may feature
which customers dislike, e.g. the level of exhaust fumes of cars, or the level of sugar
and trans fats in food. While the customer dislikes these characteristics and their pres-
ence reduces consumers’ willingness-to-pay, a reduction and/or replacement of these
attributes may be costly to the firm. Employing bait goods can thus have further ben-
eficial effects since, in addition to attracting attention to positive characteristics, the
firm could distract from negative characteristics. Also, a firm might have incentives
to focus on reducing few negative characteristics a lot instead of reducing all negative
characteristics a little bit. A label “sugar free” or “low carb” may effectively distract
from other negative characteristics, for example high levels of trans fats.
6.3. Attribute Dependence
We assume attributes to be independent. One might consider relaxing this condition
to allow for complementarity and/or substitutability between attributes in production
and/or consumption. In the case of dependencies in consumption, the importance of
an attribute vi would be a function of the level of complementary/substitute attributes.
An attribute’s level may thus decrease the attention paid to a substitute attribute even
if both attributes are several ranks apart in the attention hierarchy.
There is a complicating issue connected with allowing for dependencies in consump-
tion between attributes. The question is whether the DM is aware of all dependencies
between attributes or only of the dependencies between the attributes that receive pos-
itive attention. What if there is a dependency between an attribute that is considered
and an attribute that is neglected? In addition, one might wonder why a DM seeks to
decrease the complexity of a decision problem by neglecting some attributes but has
no problems taking into account complex interactions between attributes.
7. Conclusion
We have introduced a new approach to model limited attention and applied it to the
problem of optimal product design. The proposed attention heuristic fulfills several
desirable properties that we think are realistic in real world markets.
Using this framework, we have shown that limited attention has far-reaching im-
plications for product design and in general also for product lines. We have started
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with the case in which the monopolist can offer only a single product. In general, firms
tend to produce products that have fewer attributes than they would have if consumers
were fully attentive. However, attributes that have positive quality may actually be
produced at the same level as in a fully rational model.
We find that a monopolist would actually prefer consumers to be fully attentive. This
is because the consumers’ willingness-to-pay is lower under limited attention since they
do not fully appreciate all the qualities inherent in a product. Since the monopolist
profits from an increase in attention, there is an incentive to introduce goods of premium
quality that are not intended for sale, but which increase the attention of the consumers.
These bait goods can be used to increase attention, but they can also distract consumer
attention from attributes that are less profitable to the monopolist. Furthermore, they
can be used in such a way that the price appears less salient to consumers, which
further increases both the consumers’ willingness-to-pay and the monopolist’s profits.
A. Appendices
1. Appendix to Chapter I
1.1. Proof of Proposition I.1:
The proof is completed by the following observations:
• Claim: For most parameter constellations there does not exist an equilibrium in
which firms mix over add-on prices. If such a mixing equilibrium exists, it has no
implications on profits (and also no implications on the incentive to unshroud):
It was proven in Lemma I.1 that firms will set add-on prices such that pˆ ∈ {e, p¯}.
Now suppose that with probability γ the efficient firm 1 sets an add-on price e
and a corresponding base good price pe. With the remaining probability 1 − γ,
the efficient firm 1 sets an add-on price p¯ and a corresponding base good price
pp¯. Now suppose the inefficient firm 2 sets an add-on price e. Then, firm 2 faces
the following profit function:
pie2(p2) = γ
[
pe1 − p2 + t
2t
(p2 + e− cˆ)
]
+ (1− γ)
[
pp¯1 − p2 + t
2t
(p2 + e− cˆ)
]
.
If, in contrast, firm 2 sets an add-on price p¯, the following profit function applies:
pip¯2(p2) = γ
[
pe1 − p2 + t
2t
(p2 + α
′(p¯− cˆ))
]
+ (1− γ)
[
pp¯1 − p2 + t
2t
(p2 + α
′(p¯− cˆ))
]
.
Comparing these profits yields
e− cˆ > α′(p¯− cˆ) ⇔ max
p2
pie2(p2) > max
p2
pip¯2(p2).
Hence, for e − cˆ > α′(p¯ − cˆ) firm 2 will set an add-on price pˆ2 = e, while for
e− cˆ < α′(p¯− cˆ) firm 2 will set pˆ2 = p¯. Note that with exception of the knife-edge
case e − cˆ = α′(p¯ − cˆ) firm 2 is not indifferent between add-on prices e or p¯.
Hence, for e− cˆ 6= α′(p¯− cˆ) firm 2 will not mix over add-on prices. In addition,
for e− cˆ = α′(p¯− cˆ) firm 2 will choose the same base good price regardless of the
chosen add-on prices (pe2 = p
p¯
2). Hence, the potential mixing over add-on prices
in the knife-edge case has no effect for firm 1 since its profits are only influenced
by the base good price of its competitor.
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The same logic as above is applicable for firm 1. Firm 1 will set an add-on price
pˆ1 = e if e > α
′p¯ and an add-on price pˆ1 = p¯ if e < α′p¯. For e = α′p¯, firm 1
is indifferent and may randomize between the add-on prices with any positive
probability. However, for e = α′p¯ it holds that pe1 = p
p¯
1, and hence mixing has no
effect on the profit of firm 2.
• Claim: Suppose α′ = e−αcˆ
p¯−cˆ . Then, it holds that
e−cˆ
p¯−cˆ < α
′ < e
p¯
:
It obviously holds that e−cˆ
p¯−cˆ <
e−αcˆ
p¯−cˆ . To prove that in this case it also holds that
e−αcˆ
p¯−cˆ <
e
p¯
, consider the following transformation of equations:
α′ =
e− αcˆ
p¯− cˆ
⇔ e− α′p¯ = cˆ(α− α′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
⇒ α′ < e
p¯
.
Hence, it follows that if α′ = e−αcˆ
p¯−cˆ , α
′ must lie in the considered interval [ e−cˆ
p¯−cˆ ,
e
p¯
].
1.2. Proof of Proposition I.2:
The proof is a straightforward generalization of the main proposition of GL. As before,
sophisticated consumers anticipate high add-on prices if firms shroud the add-on. For
reasons similar to Lemma I.1, firms will only set add-on prices of either e or pˆ. This
implies that consumers are indifferent between add-on prices and shop only on the basis
of the base good price.
Now suppose that all firms shroud the add-on. Then, sophisticates will substitute
and firms will set high add-on prices p¯. The profit functions of firms then take the
form:
pii = Di(pi, pj) · (pi + α(p¯− cˆi)).
The motive for a deviation would be to increase the fraction of consumers that buy the
add-on. Sophisticates will only buy the add-on if the firm unshrouds (making add-on
prices observable) and sets a low add-on price e. Then, the profit function is
pii = Di(pi, pj) · (pi + e− cˆi).
When comparing these profits, the only difference lies in the add-on markup. Since
shrouding and pricing take place simultaneously, the non-deviating firm cannot adjust
its base good price pj. Furthermore, the base good demand Di(·) is independent of
add-on prices and also independent of the composition of the consumer population.
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Hence, for α = e−cˆi
p¯−cˆi both profits are equal and firm i is indifferent between shrouding
and unshrouding. For α < e−cˆi
p¯−cˆi the firm has an incentive to deviate from shrouding,
while for α > e−cˆi
p¯−cˆi the firm will prefer to leave the market shrouded. Note here that
since firms have different add-on production costs (0 = cˆ1 < cˆ2 = cˆ), they have different
incentives about shrouding. In particular, the firm with the lowest add-on production
cost has the strongest incentive to unshroud the add-on (the highest critical value of
α). It holds that no firm has an incentive to deviate to unshrouding if
α ≥ max
{
e− cˆ1
p¯− cˆ1 ,
e− cˆ2
p¯− cˆ2
}
= max
{
e
p¯
,
e− cˆ
p¯− cˆ
}
=
e
p¯
.
1.3. Proof of Proposition I.3:
If sophisticates can observe add-on prices, firms in a shrouded subgame adjust their
add-on prices to the consumer population just like in an unshrouded subgame. The
only difference is that they either face α myopes in a shrouded subgame or α′ myopes
in an unshrouded subgame. Applying previous results, this implies that in a shrouded
subgame, firms will set add-on prices pˆ1 = pˆ2 = e for α <
e−cˆ
p¯−cˆ , add-on prices pˆ1 =
e, pˆ2 = p¯ for
e−cˆ
p¯−cˆ < α <
e
p¯
and add-on prices pˆ1 = pˆ2 = p¯ for
e
p¯
< α. Now we can
compare profits to determine the incentives of firms to unshroud the add-on.
First consider the case α < e−cˆ
p¯−cˆ , in which firms will set low add-on prices e in the
shrouded subgame. This yields profits of
piS11 =
1
2t
(
t+
cˆ
3
)2
and piS12 =
1
2t
(
t− cˆ
3
)2
,
which are independent of α. Since α′ < α, firms will make the same profits piU1 (= piS1)
in the unshrouded subgame. Hence, no firm has a strict incentive to unshroud the add-
on and therefore a shrouding equilibrium exists.
Now suppose it holds that e−cˆ
p¯−cˆ < α <
e
p¯
. Then, if the add-on is shrouded, firms will
set add-on prices pˆ1 = e and pˆ2 = p¯. This yields profits of
piS21 =
1
2t
(
t+
αcˆ
3
− αp¯− e
3
)2
and piS22 =
1
2t
(
t− αcˆ
3
+
αp¯− e
3
)2
.
Now suppose that any firm unshrouded the add-on, thereby reducing the fraction of
myopes to α′. This implies that firms would earn profits of either piU1 or piU2 in an
unshrouded subgame.1 Examining these profits, it holds that piS21 > pi
U1
1 if and only if
piS22 < pi
U1
2 . Equivalently, pi
S2
1 > pi
U2
1 holds if and only if pi
S2
2 < pi
U2
2 . Hence, one of the
firms makes higher profits in the unshrouded subgame and therefore has an incentive
to unshroud the add-on.2
1It always holds that α′ < α. Hence, α < ep¯ implies α
′ < ep¯ and the case U3 can be neglected.
2Firms are indifferent about shrouding at the lower bound of the interval α = e−cˆp¯−cˆ .
78 Strategic Product Placement and Pricing in Markets with Inattentive Consumers
For the last case e
p¯
< α, firms in a shrouded subgame will set high add-on prices p¯.
Hence, this case is equal to the analysis of the main model and a shrouding equilibrium
only exists at the knife-edge case α′ = e−αcˆ
p¯−cˆ .
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2. Appendix to Chapter II
2.1. Proof of Lemma II.1:
Following the derivations in the main text, the aggregate profit of the colluding firms
is equal to:
piM(p, pˆ) = [α (1− F (p)) + (1− α)(1− F (p+ pˆ))](p+ pˆ).
To derive the desired result we need to make two case distinctions:
• Suppose that p+ pˆ ≤ v:
Then it holds that some sophisticates still participate in the market and hence
1− F (p+ pˆ) > 0. Now we want to derive the optimal base good price:
∂piM
∂p
= [−αf(p)− (1− α)f(p+ pˆ)](p+ pˆ) + α(1− F (p)) + (1− α)(1− F (p+ pˆ)) != 0
⇔ p = 1
2
(v − (2− α)pˆ). (A.1)
Recall that we have assumed that some sophisticates participate in the market.
Then, if the add-on price is below its maximum value, the firms can increase
their profit by lowering the base good price marginally while increasing the add-
on price by the same amount. This leaves the total price of the product bundle
and the demand from sophisticates unchanged but increases the demand from
myopic consumers. Hence, it is profitable to increase the add-on price pˆ until it
reaches its upper bound p¯ or until the base good price p reaches its lower bound.
We now want to argue that the base good price reaches its lower bound before
the add-on price reaches its lower bound. Suppose the add-on price reaches its
upper bound first. Then the value of the base good price (A.1) would be:
p =
1
2
(v − (2− α)p¯).
Since we have assumed that v ≤ p¯, the above expression would yield a negative
price of the base good, i.e. p < 0. This is not allowed in terms of the model
due to the lower bound for the base good. Hence, the optimal base good price is
pM = 0.
• Suppose that p+ pˆ > v:
This implies that no sophisticated consumer participates in the market, i.e. 1−
F (p + pˆ) = 0. Note here that in this case the profit is strictly increasing in the
add-on price pˆ and firms will set the add-on price equal to the maximum add-on
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price, i.e. pˆ = p¯. Maximizing the profit of firms over the base good price then
yields:
∂piM
∂p
= −αf(p)(p+ p¯) + α(1− F (p)) != 0
⇔ p = v
2
(
1− p¯
v
)
.
This base good price is negative if v < p¯, as was assumed in Assumption II.1.
Hence, due to the lower bound for the base good price, it is again optimal to set
pM = 0.
2.2. Proof of Proposition II.2:
To prove that an optimal deviation from collusion includes an unshrouding of the add-
on, we have to compare the different possibilities how firms can collude and how a firm
could deviate from the collusion.
• First consider the case in which the deviating firm decides to unshroud the add-
on. As we have already shown in the main text, the deviating firm will set an
add-on price of pˆdevi =
v
2
and earn a deviation profit of pidevi =
v
4
. The add-on
price pˆdevi =
v
2
is feasible since v ≤ p¯, which ensures that pˆdevi ≤ p.
• Now suppose that the deviating firm does not unshroud the add-on. In this case,
we have to distinguish whether the deviating firm charges an add-on price below
v (inner solution) or an add-on price above v (corner solution).
– If the deviating firm charges an add-on price below v, the optimal add-
on price was pidevi =
[
α
n
+ (1− α)(1− pˆ
v
)
]
pˆ, yielding a deviation profit of
pidevi =
v
4(1−α)
(
1− αn−1
n
)2
.
Note that, for some parameter constellations, it might be the case that
pˆdevi =
v
2(1−α)
(
1− αn−1
n
)
> v. In this case, the derived add-on price that a
deviating firm sets is not an inner solution since no sophisticated consumer
will buy the product bundle. It holds that the add-on price of the optimal
deviation is feasible if:
pˆdevi =
v
2(1− α)
(
1− αn− 1
n
)
≤ v
⇔ α ≤ n
n+ 1
.
Hence, the deviation add-on price of the inner solution pidevi =
[
α
n
+ (1− α)(1− pˆ
v
)
]
pˆ
is only feasible if α ≤ n
n+1
.
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– Now suppose that the deviating firm charges an add-on price above v. In
this case, the profit function of the deviating firm is:
pidevi =
[α
n
]
pˆ.
It is easy to verify that the add-on price that maximizes the above profit
function is pˆ = p¯, which would yield a profit of pidevi =
1
n
αp¯. As already
argued in the main text, this cannot be a profitable deviation since this
deviation profit is lower than the profit under collusion. Hence, it will never
be a profitable deviation to charge an add-on price above v.
In summary, we can conclude that a profitably deviating firm that decides not
to unshroud the add-on cannot do better than obtaining a profit of pidevi =
v
4(1−α)
(
1− αn−1
n
)2
. However, recall that the corresponding add-on price is only
feasible if α ≤ n
n+1
.
Now we can check what the optimal deviation strategy looks like. Comparing the de-
viation profit that a firm can obtain by unshrouding to the profit without unshrouding
yields:
pidevi,shrouding ≤ pidevi,unshrouding
⇔ v
4(1− α)
(
1− αn− 1
n
)2
≤ v
4
⇔
(
1− αn− 1
n
)2
≤ 1− α
⇔ 2− n
n
+ α
(
n− 1
n
)2
≤ 0
⇔ α ≤ n(n− 2)
(n− 1)2 . (A.2)
Recall that a deviation without unshrouding the add-on can only be profitable if α ≤
n
n+1
. Hence, when we want to check whether a deviation without unshrouding can be
optimal, we can focus on cases with α ≤ n
n+1
. Then the inequality (A.2) holds if the
following relation is fulfilled:
n(n− 2)
(n− 1)2 ≥
n
n+ 1
⇔ n ≥ 3,
which is fulfilled by assumption. Therefore, we can conclude that if a profitable devia-
tion exists, unshrouding will be part of the optimal deviation strategy.
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2.3. Proof of Proposition II.4:
Suppose firms coordinate on prices pˆcoll, yielding some collusive profit picoll: In analogy
to the above analysis, the critical discount factor is then given by:
δ∗ =
n− picoll
pidev
n
,
which is decreasing in the collusion-to-deviation profit ratio pi
coll
pidev
. Hence, the less at-
tractive a deviation is relative to the collusive play, the more stable collusion is.
Recall that if a profitable deviation exists, it is optimal to set pˆdev = v
2
and unshroud
the add-on, thereby earning pidevi =
v
4
. This deviation profit is feasible only if firms
coordinated on prices pˆcoll ≥ v
2
in the collusive play. Then the critical discount factor
is minimized by coordinating on maximum profits, which are piM = v
4(1−α) or pi
M = αp¯.
Hence, coordinating on lower profits cannot stabilize collusion.
Now suppose firms coordinate on prices pˆcoll < v
2
, which yields an aggregate profit of
pi(pˆ) = [α+ (1−α)(1− pˆ
v
)]pˆ. Playing pˆdev = v
2
does not correspond to an undercutting
anymore and a firm would then optimally deviate by undercutting the collusive price
marginally, irrespective of the (un)shrouding decision. This actually follows from the
fact that deviation profits are increasing in pˆdev for all add-on prices pˆdev < v
2
.
We will now show that a deviating firm still optimally decides to unshroud the add-
on, thereby making use of the fact that the optimal deviation price does not depend
on the (un)shrouding decision:
pidevi,unshrouding > pi
dev
i,shrouding
⇔
[
1− pˆ
dev
i
v
]
pˆdevi >
[
α
n
+ (1− α)(1− pˆ
dev
i
v
)
]
pˆdevi
⇔ 1− pˆ
dev
v
>
1
n
This holds since n ≥ 3 and pˆdev ≤ v
2
. Now we that know that a deviating firm will
optimally unshroud the add-on and undercut the collusive price marginally, it remains
to check whether the critical discount factor can be lowered by coordinating on add-on
prices pˆcoll < v
2
. Since colluding with the monopoly price leads to a collusion-to-
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deviation profit ratio of at least 1/(1− α), it must hold that:
picoll
pidev
=
[α + (1− α)(1− pˆ
v
)]pˆ[
1− pˆ
v
]
pˆ
>
1
1− α
⇔ (1− α)
[
1− (1− α) pˆ
v
]
> 1− pˆ
v
⇔ [1− (1− α)2] pˆ
v
> α
⇔ α (2− α) pˆ
v
> α
⇔ pˆ > v
2− α,
which contradicts the assumption that firms colluded with prices pˆcoll < v
2
. Note that
it might be more profitable for a deviating firm to play the corner solution and earn
pidev = αp¯ than to unshroud and undercut the collusive price marginally. But since this
would only decrease the collusion-to-deviation profit ratio and result in a higher critical
discount factor, collusion would be further destabilized. We can therefore conclude that
coordinating on other than monopoly profits cannot stabilize collusion.
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3. Appendix to Chapter III
3.1. Derivation of an Optimal Attention Allocation under Cognitive
Constraints
Suppose a decision maker faces the problem of choosing between a finite number of
alternatives from the set A. Each alternative is described by a finite vector of attributes
i ∈ I. Let xai denote the extent to which alternative a features attribute i. The
experienced utility of each alternative a ∈ A is expressed by
u(a) =
∑
i
vix
a
i , (A.3)
where vi denotes the value the DM ascribes to an additional unit xi of attribute i ∈
I. Thus the choice problem can be expressed by (A, v) where A = (xai )a∈A,i∈I and
v = (vi)i∈I . Suppose a decision-maker (DM) faces cognitive constraints such that she
incurs cognitive costs whenever she faces a choice between multi-attribute alternatives.
i.e. |I| ≥ 2. The DM faces no information problem, she perfectly knows the values A
and v. She, however, faces problems whenever she needs to integrate this information
in order to make a choice. She thus imperfectly considers or takes into account the
information, and thus evaluates each alternative by its decision utility given by
u˜(a) =
∑
i
[
mivix
a
i + (1−mi)vixdi
]
, (A.4)
where mi ∈ [0, 1] can be thought of as an attention parameter. mi = 1 denotes full
attention, while mi = 0 denotes complete neglect. When neglecting the information in
one dimension/attribute, the DM ascribes some value xdi to each alternative. Depending
on the assumptions one wants to make, this default value may differ. If the DM is “on
average right”, one may choose xdi = x¯i where x¯i is the average value of xi across
the available alternatives. If the DM is pessimistic, xdi = mina∈A x
a
i might be a good
assumption. If the DM has some default alternative, xdi = x
default
i could be reasonable.
Regardless of these assumptions, if the DM neglects a dimension, i.e. if mi = 0, ∀i ∈ I,
she is not able to discriminate between alternatives along this dimension.3
3The exact assumptions about xdi are irrelevant for the behavior of the DM. For any value of mi ∈
[0, 1] and for any modeler’s choice of (xdi )i=1,...,n, a constant
∑
i(1 − mi)vixdi is added to the
decision utility of each alternative. For a given vector (mi)i=1,...,n, this constant is identical across
alternatives. It may differ across sets of alternatives because mi is a function of this set, as we are
about to derive. Yet, it does not differ across alternatives for a given set of alternatives. It has
thus no impact on the desirability of one alternative over another. With no behavioral impact, we
drop it in the main section without loss of generality.
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Now, let’s look at the error from imperfectly considering the dimensions:
∑
a∈A
[∑
i
(
vix
a
i −mivixai − (1−mi)vixdi
)]
=
∑
i
[
(1−mi)vi
∑
a∈A
(xai − xdi )
]
.
An optimal attention allocation will weigh losses from an erroneous representation
against losses from incurred cognition costs.4 Remember that we seek to model cog-
nitive costs associated with complexity. It should thus be straightforward to assume
that considering a single dimension is costless, as there is no complexity involved. Con-
sidering a second dimension involves the need to make a first trade-off consideration
and should thus be associated with some positive cognition costs. Taking into account
additional dimensions should become increasingly costly as the number of trade-off con-
siderations that need to be made rises exponentially. It thus matters which dimensions
are considered “first”. Denote by r : I → {1, ..., n} the order in which the attributes are
considered. We will henceforth refer to it as the attention hierarchy. Given some place
in the hierarchy, each dimension is associated with some cognitive effort cost κr(i).
The exact loss function is, again, a modeling choice. It should include losses from
an imperfect problem representation and a loss from exerting cognitive effort. Let us
consider the following maximization problem:
max
mi
(−L) = −1
2
∑
i
(1−mi)2µi −
∑
i
κr(i)|mi|, (A.5)
where µi could have several forms depending on the modeling choice. Consider, for
example, xdi = x¯i and losses from errors that are quadratic in each dimension. Then
one might use µi = v
2
i σ
2
i , where σ
2
i is the variance of attribute i in the set of alternatives.
Consider the case xdi = mina∈A x
a
i . Then µi is the product of vi and the sum (or the
average) increase in value by considering the true value of an alternative. Whatever
the modeling choice, as xdi is independent of mi, µi is a term capturing a product of vi
and some measure of dispersion of attribute xi in the set of alternatives.
The term capturing cognitive effort cost in a dimension i is the `1 norm of the
attention parameter mi times the cognitive cost parameter associated with the rank of
i.5
4One may argue that the DM’s objective is to make the right decision, not to form a correct repre-
sentation of the world. So, one might want to insert the loss from taking the wrong action into the
objective function. Yet, to determine that loss, one needs to know the right action. The problem
would amount to choosing the optimal attention with hindsight. Without the information about
the correct action, the best thing one can do is to optimize the representation of the world one
bases decisions on. An accurate representation of an alternative’s desirability is vital to make the
correct choice.
5For a more elaborate discussion of modeling cognitive costs with such a cost function, see Gabaix
(2011).
86 Strategic Product Placement and Pricing in Markets with Inattentive Consumers
The optimal solution of problem (A.5) is then given by
mi = max {0, 1− κi/µi} . (A.6)
Hence, whenever µi < κr(i), dimension i is neglected. One could thus interpret µi as a
measure of importance of dimension i to the DM. If the dimension is important enough
compared to the cognitive costs associated with its consideration, it will be taken into
account. And, given that it is taken into account (mi > 0), the extent to which a
dimension is taken into account rises in the importance of the dimension.
It is important to note that the attention mi which a dimension i receives is cru-
cially determined by the cognitive costs κr(i) associated with its consideration. As
was discussed before these costs shall reflect the rising difficulty of solving increasingly
complex problems. We will thus assume
κr = 0, for r = 1, (A.7)
κr+1 > κr, ∀r ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} .
The attribute which is considered first, i.e. the attribute which receives rank 1 in
the attention hierarchy, is considered without cognitive effort. Considering additional
attributes becomes increasingly costly. The attention hierarchy r is thus crucial for the
eventual attention allocation. Consider the following 2-step procedure. First, the DM
needs to select an attention hierarchy r : I → {1, ..., n} which associates each dimension
with some consideration costs κr(i). One can think of this as the problem to determine
which dimension to consider first, which second, and so on. After assigning a rank
to each dimension, the DM solves the above described problem of optimal attention
allocation given some assignment of consideration costs. The problem can then be
solved backward. Given any assignment r(i), the optimal attention allocation is given
by (A.6). Plugging this back into the objective function (A.5) yields
(−L) =
∑
i:mi>0
[
−1
2
(
κ2r(i)
µ2i
)
µi − κr(i) +
κ2r(i)
µi
]
− 1
2
∑
j:mj=0
µj
=
∑
i:mi>0
[
κ2r(i)
µi
− κr(i)
]
− 1
2
∑
j:mj=0
µj.
The objective at the first stage, anticipating the result of the second stage, is thus
max
r(i)
∑
i:mi>0
[
1
2
κ2r(i)
µi
− κr(i)
]
− 1
2
∑
j:mj=0
µj. (A.8)
Now we can state the following result:
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Proposition A.1. The optimal assignment r∗(i) will satisfy:
µi > µj ⇒ r(i) < r(j). (A.9)
The optimal assignment will thus assign higher attention ranks to more important di-
mensions.
Proof. Under an optimal assignment r∗(i) interchanging the ranks of any two attributes
i, j ∈ I may not lead to an increase in (−L). Note that the objective function (−L) is
additively-separable across attributes. We may thus confine attention to the parts of
the objective function that depend on the two attributes i and j.
Suppose µi = µj. It is easy to see that interchanging their ranks has no effect on
the objective function. We will thus only look at cases in which µi > µj. Take any
ranking r. Under this ranking attribute i and j are associated with some cognitive costs
κr(i), κr(j). Denote by κh = max
{
κr(i), κr(j)
}
and κl = min
{
κr(i), κr(j)
}
. Whichever
attribute is assigned κl has a higher rank under r. We will now show that if r does
not assign κl to attribute i (the one with strictly higher importance), r cannot be a
maximizer for (−L) for some set of cognitive costs (κ1, κ2, ...) satisfying our assumption
(A.7).
Let us distinguish four cases:
(i) κh > κl > µi > µj. Both attributes are neglected before and after interchanging
the rank. The objective function is thus invariant to such a change in ranking.
(ii) µi > µj > κh > κl. Both attributes are taken into account at the lower rank.
However, it is better to assign attribute i the higher rank (and thus κl) if
1
2
κ2l
µi
− κl + 1
2
κ2h
µj
− κh > 1
2
κ2l
µj
− κl + 1
2
κ2h
µi
− κh
⇔ κ
2
l
µi
+
κ2h
µj
>
κ2l
µj
+
κ2h
µi
⇔ (κ2h − κ2l )µi > (κ2h − κ2l )µj
⇔ µi > µj.
(iii) κh > µi > µj > κl. Both attributes are considered at the higher rank but
neglected at the lower rank. It is better to assign attribute i the higher rank (and
thus κl) if
1
2
κ2l
µi
− κl − 1
2
µj >
1
2
κ2l
µj
− κl − 1
2
µi
⇔ κ2l µj − µ2jµi > κ2l µi − µ2iµj
⇔ µiµj(µi − µj) > κ2l (µi − µj)
⇔ µiµj > κ2l , which is true since µi > µj > κl.
88 Strategic Product Placement and Pricing in Markets with Inattentive Consumers
(iv) µi > κh > µj > κl. Attribute i is considered both at the higher and lower rank.
Attribute j is only considered at the higher rank but neglected at the lower rank.
Still, it is better to assign attribute i to the higher rank if
1
2
κ2l
µi
− κl − 1
2
µj >
1
2
κ2l
µj
− κl + 1
2
κ2h
µi
− κh.
This indeed holds true, since
1
2
κ2l
(
1
µi
− 1
µj
)
− 1
2
µj − 1
2
κ2h
1
µi
+ κh =
1
µiµj
[
1
2
κ2l (µj − µi)−
1
2
µiµ
2
j −
1
2
κ2hµj + κhµiµj
]
=
1
2µiµj
[
κ2l (µj − µi) +
(
κhµiµj − µiµ2j
)
+
(
κhµiµj − κ2hµj
)]
=
1
2µiµj
[
κ2l (µj − µi) + µiµj(κh − µj) + κhµj(µi − κh)
]
>
1
2µiµj
[
κ2l (µj − µi) + κhµj(κh − µj) + κhµj(µi − κh)
]
=
1
2µiµj
[
(µjκh − κ2l )(µi − µj)
]
>0,
in which the first inequality (line 4) holds since µi > κh > κj, and hence the
middle term is replaced by strictly lower term. The final inequality holds since
µi > κh > µj > κl.
We have now shown that an optimal solution is to set r(i) according to (A.9). One
may argue that this rule may not be obeyed for dimensions for which case (i) holds.
While this is true, one can counter that (A.9) is optimal for a choice problem (A, v),
and thus for a given vector of (µi)i=1..n, for all cognitive cost vectors (κ1, ..., κn) for
which κr+1 > κr, ∀r = 1, ..., n. The optimal assignment (A.9) is thus invariant to
changes in the cost vector (e.g. due to changes in cognitive resources for some given
choice task). In addition, even if case (i) may hold for some attributes for a given cost
vector, it cannot hold for all attributes as long as κ1 = 0.
Characteristics of the Attention Function
This section seeks to discuss some characteristics of the attention function, that we
derived.
First, more important attributes receive (weakly) more attention than less important
attributes, ∂mi/∂µi ≥ 0. The attention each attribute receives thus depends positively
on its value to the decision-maker. In addition to this internal factor, the attributes dis-
persion within the choice set A increases attention. The attention an attribute receives
Strategic Product Placement and Pricing in Markets with Inattentive Consumers 89
thus depends on the choice environment. It is thus possible to attract attention to
an attribute by varying the choice set appropriately.
Second, as one attribute gains importance it may eventually gain rank in the atten-
tion hierarchy. As another attribute receives a lower rank this other attribute loses
attention, ∂mi/∂µj ≤ 0, with strict inequality only if ∂mj/∂µj > 0. It is hence pos-
sible to distract attention from an attribute. It is noteworthy that this distraction
effect only works through the attention hierarchy and is thus discontinuous. While this
feature might be mathematically undesirable, it has some desirable effects which we
will discuss shortly.
Next, the attention process features neglect, or, in Gabaix’ terminology, the at-
tention vector is sparse. Technically, for any decision problem (A, v) there exist vec-
tors of cognitive costs κ satisfying our assumptions such that there exist attributes
i ∈ I : mi = 0 whenever |I| ≥ 2. So, for any complex choice problem, that is one which
involves at least two dimensions, cognitive costs may lead to the neglect of at least
one dimension. Similarly, for any vector of cognitive costs κ satisfying our assumptions
there exist choice problems (A, v) : |I| ≥ 2, such that at least one of the dimensions is
ignored.
In addition, due to our assumptions on κ, for any choice problem (A, v) there exist
attributes i ∈ I : mi > 0. So, there is no complete neglect. As we seek to model
the need to simplify a complex choice problem, the DM always considers at least one
dimension as this amounts to solving a simple choice problem. This directly implies
that complexity costs, as modeled here, will never lead to strictly dominated choices.
The attention hierarchy is not just implicit. Any two attributes that are considered
receive a different weight: mi 6= mj, ∀i, j ∈ I : mi,mj > 0. More specifically, for
any two attributes that are considered, the higher ranking attribute receives strictly
more attention.
This, together with the impossibility of complete neglect, implies that the attention
process always features over- and underweighting. Let m¯ = 1
n
∑
imi. Then for
any complex choice problem and cognitive cost vector κ satisfying our assumptions
there exist attributes which are overweighted and attributes which are underweighted.
Formally, ∀(A, v, κ) : ∃i ∈ I : mi > m¯ and ∃j ∈ I : mj < m¯. This is important as it
implies that under the derived attention function the decision utility of an alternative
is not just an affine transformation of experienced utility.
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Final Remarks
The optimal attention allocation rule
mi = max
{
0, 1− κr(i)
µi
}
µi > µj ⇒ κr(i) < κr(j), ∀i, j ∈ I
we derived is, of course, more general than the attention allocation rule we employ in
the main part of this paper. We have decided to opt for µi = maxa∈A−min a ∈ A as a
simple measure of dispersion as it yields unique results for the optimal product design.
The results will remain qualitatively unchanged when employing a different measure
of dispersion. In addition, we have assumed a tie-breaking rule µi = µj and vi > vj ⇒
κr(i) < κr(j), ∀i, j ∈ I for the determination of the attention hierarchy. Assuming a
different tie-breaking rule would not change our results qualitatively.
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